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Abstract:
This study asserts that China’s efforts in promoting Tai-
wan’s meaningful expansion of international space will
contribute greatly to China’s own national interest.  The
analysis will first describe in general terms how the advan-
tages that IGOs and INGOs present to aspiring members
return benefits to the international community by includ-
ing Taiwan.  The next section will elaborate the functional-
ity of the “mutual non-denial” principle in cross-Strait
relations. The third section will survey the general status
of Taiwan’s international participation in recent years to
derive some characteristics of cross-Strait interactions on
this matter.  Fourth, it will explore how and why a stronger
China can facilitate Taiwan’s requests for the advance-
ment of cross-Strait rapprochement.  The analysis will fo-
cus more on what China can benefit from fulfilling
Taiwan’s demands in the sphere of IGOs.
Key words: Taiwan, International Space, International Or-
ganization, Mutual Non-denial Principle, China
I. INTRODUCTION
Taiwan’s regime change in 2008 from the Democratic Progres-
sive Party (DPP) to the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) rep-
resented a drastic shift in Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy toward the
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  President MA Ying-Jeou’s
proclamation of “no unification, no independence, and no use of
military force” under the “framework of the Republic of China
Constitution” was a policy departure from the cross-Strait policy of
the two preceding presidents, LEE Teng-hui (1988-2000) and
CHEN Shui-bian (2000-2008).  Both former presidents had relent-
lessly pursued Taiwan’s de jure status of statehood in diplomatic
rhetoric and action, and both had raised China’s fear of Taiwan
splitting from the “Chinese motherland” and heightened concerns
within the United States of possible entrapment in a likely conflict
with China.  Ma’s reversal of the previous administration’s con-
frontational approach came with a request.  Ma sought ample inter-
national space with regard to the sustainability of diplomatic allies
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of Taiwan and the expansion of Taiwan’s participation in interna-
tional governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs).  The key to peaceful coexis-
tence and the expansion of Taiwan’s international space still resides
in the willingness of both sides to reach a consensus on how each
party should treat its counterpart in bilateral relations.  The cross-
Strait historical legacy, power imbalance, social constructs, reputa-
tional considerations, and other factors have made it difficult for
both sides to recognize each other as worthy counterparts for a mu-
tually beneficial resolution.  Thus, the improbability of mutual rec-
ognition of both sides as sovereign entities has prompted a new way
of thinking — a “mutual non-denial” of either side of the Strait as a
legitimate “political entity” in separate areas of governance.  This
maneuver allows each side to avoid the “tight jacket” demanded of
sovereign statehood recognition.  Seeing such an innovative idea
coming out of left field shows a desire for an enlarged win-win situ-
ation, and a determination to shy away from the impasse of political
formality in favor of problem-solving across the Strait.  The “mu-
tual non-denial” proposal has been envisioned by scholars, such as
Hungdah CHIU and Su CHI, and advocated by Ma as a prominent
framework in charting future cross-Strait courses and fulfilling Tai-
wan’s desire for international participation.1
China has not officially rejected or endorsed Ma’s initiation of
the “mutual non-denial” principle as a governmental agenda in re-
sponse to Taiwan’s request for active and meaningful international
participation.  However, China has tacitly chosen to accommodate
Taiwan cautiously and selectively.  As a result, the number of states
offering diplomatic recognition to Taiwan remains, so far, largely
unchanged, even though there are unsettling reports of Taiwan’s
diplomatic allies thinking of switching recognition from Taiwan to
China have surfaced every now and then.  In contrast to Taiwan’s
steady holding of diplomatic allies, there have been no major
breakthroughs for Taiwan to work with international organizations
and non-governmental organizations.
This study postulates that the “mutual non-denial” principle as
a theoretical framework can pave a workable path on which to
overcome the seemingly insurmountable barrier of sovereignty is-
sues for cross-Strait relations.  In particular, the adoption of the
mutual non-denial principle in practice is a logical and practical op-
1. Su Chi, “Professor Hungdah Chiu, Taiwan, and Cross-Strait Relations,” Mary-
land Journal of International Law, 27, 2012, 36-47.
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tion for Taiwan’s expansion of international space, which has en-
countered resistance from China.  This study also asserts that
China’s steady and sedulous efforts in promoting Taiwan’s mean-
ingful expansion of international space will contribute greatly to
China’s own national interests of improving relations with Taiwan
and preventing Taiwan from drifting further away from the cross-
Strait status quo.  China’s accommodation to Taiwan’s diplomatic
needs will result not only in a mutually beneficial situation for both
sides, but also without severely compromising the core interests of
either side.  This friendly gesture toward Taiwan will also enhance
China’s status as a benevolent and pragmatic actor in its continued
ascension to a global power.
This analysis will first describe in general terms the advantages
IGOs, INGOs, members of the international community, and major
powers, such as China, will reap by including Taiwan.  The next sec-
tion will elaborate upon the functionality of the “mutual non-de-
nial” principle in cross-Strait relations.  In light of Taiwan’s
diplomatic relations, the third section examines a cross-Strait diplo-
matic truce as a practical application of the mutual-non-denial prin-
ciple.  The fourth section will survey the general status of Taiwan’s
international participation in recent years to derive some character-
istics of cross-Strait interactions on this matter.  In the context of
recent trends of Taiwan’s participation in IGOs, the fifth section
elaborates why it is in China’s national interests to promote Tai-
wan’s international participation, and how a stronger China can fa-
cilitate Taiwan’s requests and better manage them for the
advancement of cross-Strait rapprochement.  There is one caveat
for this study:  since numerous studies explore this topic from Tai-
wan’s perspective, this study will focus the discussion more on how
China can benefit from fulfilling Taiwan’s demands.2
II. THE FEELING IS MUTUAL: INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND ASPIRING MEMBERS
Regardless of the focus of the theoretical framework one em-
ploys—realism, liberalism, or constructivism—it has become a com-
mon tenet that an international institution, IGO or INGO, offers its
members numerous advantages in international politics and be-
2. For Taiwan and NGOs, see Wei-chin Lee, “Diplomatic Impetus and Altruistic
Impulse: NGOs and the Expansion of Taiwan’s International Space,” Taiwan-US Quar-
terly Analysis, Brookings Institution, no. 10, July 2012.  <www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2012/07/16-taiwan-ngo-lee>.
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comes a crucial element in international relations.  There are sev-
eral distinctive features pertinent to this study in theoretical
literature on international institutions.  First, the powerful tide of
globalization driven by material forces of change in communication,
knowledge sharing, and economic exchanges has crossed geo-
graphic bounds.  Globalization has remolded social and cultural ar-
rangements and has impinged on the cognitive world of human
behavior and awareness of the necessity of cooperation in manag-
ing the global commons.3  Hence, the amplification and densifica-
tion of these institutions is a reflection of, and a response to, the
shift in material settings and ideational ramifications by states and
non-state actors.  Although this does not pronounce the end of
John Herz’s territorial state, it indicates that the idea of a world
society composed of sovereign states is no longer effective in man-
aging global functional activities.4  The functional disability can be
redressed with the principle of inclusiveness through welcoming the
participation of multitudinous actors beyond the confine of the
Westphalian system and the principle of democratization by offer-
ing various actors an appropriate forum for interest representation
and articulation in global policy deliberation processes.
Second, liberalism has long advocated the importance of inter-
national institutions as part of the human habit of organizing and
regulating orderly interactions in communication, commerce, fi-
nance, service, trade, transportation, travel, and other areas due to
the fast pace of globalization.  International institutions become a
nexus of a pluralistic collection of transnational interests and a key
vehicle for the development of international laws.  With an empha-
sis on accountability, reciprocity, and transparency in rule setting
and enforcements in international institutions, liberals are con-
vinced that the increasing pooling of sovereignty and ongoing com-
promise of national interests would maximize institutional
effectiveness and ultimately receive endorsements from state actors
and non-state actors to honor their commitments and compliance.
Rather than establishing a world government, liberals hope to
achieve what Barry Buzan called a “more mature anarchy” for bet-
ter cooperation among states.5  In addition, international institu-
3. John Gerald Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (New York: Routledge,
1998); Malcom Waters, Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2001).
4. John H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” World Politics, 9(4),
1957, 473-493.
5. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1983), 97.
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tions also generate a boomerang effect to persuade members to
“internalize” institutional rules and norms in the arena of domestic
jurisdiction, as evidenced in both Amy Gurowitz’s study on the
profound impact of international legal norms and migrant rights on
Japan’s domestic laws, and Harold Koh’s description of how the in-
ternational norm against torture has been interwoven into various
domestic laws.6  By opening the gate wide to aspiring members, in-
ternational institutions wish to extend the applications of their
norms and rules as much as possible.  Through reiterated applica-
tions, members will consider those rules and norms to be “nearly
universal” standard practices.  When more states become affiliated
with IGOs, a state’s membership could make the non-state actor’s
job as a legitimate watchdog of agreed international rules much eas-
ier within said state, rather than the non-state actor being viewed as
an unwelcome busybody that could encounter resistance from state
authorities.7
Third, realism is less optimistic than liberalism in its assessment
of the necessity and contributions of international institutions.
However, realism does recognize the positive instrumentality and
functionality of international institutions in reducing transaction
costs in global resource management, and in providing participants
with justifications and legitimacy in the convergence of self-inter-
ests and global benefits.  For realists, in an anarchical world with
power asymmetry, states naturally fear and distrust one another
and, hence, rely essentially on self-help for survival.  As Thucydides
keenly observed in his epic description of the Melian Dialogue,
“Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must.”8
Still, compulsion and expediency demand that states not only
possess muscle power, but also employ brainpower to win support
from institutions, IGOs and INGOs alike, to achieve the state’s
goals of survival and economic sustainability.  The creation and
6. Harold Hongju Koh, “Filartida v. Pena-Irala: Judicial Internationalization into
Domestic Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture,” in Interna-
tional Law Stories, ed. John E. Noyer, Laura A. Dickinson, and Mark W. Janis (New
York: Foundation Press, 2007), 45-76; Amy Gurowitz, “International Law, Politics, and
Migrant Rights,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 131-150.
7. David A. Martin, “Effective of International Law on Migration Policy and Prac-
tice: The Uses of Hypocrisy,” International Migration Review, 23(3), 1989, 554.
8. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (London, J.M. Dent; New York: E. P. Dut-
ton, 1910), translated by Richard Crawley, book 5, chapter 89, section 1.
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maintenance of international institutions can be considered struc-
tural modifiers to shape and shove actors within a system devised in
the hegemon’s image.  Even as the power of the hegemon declines,
the long practiced hegemon-led and molded institutional rules are
likely to have an enduring influence in easing the power transition
between hegemons without immediately impacting the declining
power.  The best way to solidify the hegemon’s influence is through
institutional design to condense its regime setting, rather than a raw
display of material power and military force.  To gain the compli-
ance and cooperation of weaker counterparts, the strong has to
move beyond the employment of material force.  As Rousseau pro-
claimed, “The strongest is never strong enough to always be the
master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into
duty.”9
Fourth, accordingly, constructivism offers a helping hand to
major powers by stressing the importance of ideas to substantiate
its dominance in either bilateral or multilateral settings.  Any major
power would intend to use its immense financial resources and po-
litical preponderance to ensure the submission of weaker counter-
parts in the short-run, and to construct the principles, rules, and
norms in international institutions to redefine the normative beliefs,
interest calculation, and behaviors of participating members within
the institutional structure legitimized by the stronger party in the
long-run.  Power surely plays a crucial role in conditioning state be-
haviors.  But when mutual understandings have been institutional-
ized between states, they serve as guidelines to state behaviors
without coercive force and extensive material incentives.  On this
point, Christian Reus-Smit explains eloquently,10
International Politics, like all politics, is an inherently so-
cial activity.  Through politics states and other actors con-
stitute their social and material lives, determining not only
“who gets what when and how,” but also who will be ac-
cepted as a legitimate actor and what will pass as rightful
conduct.  International politics takes place within a frame-
work of rules and norms, and states and other actors de-
fine and redefine these understandings through their
discursive practices.
9. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Ine-
quality (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), ed. Lester G. Crocker, book I,
chapter 3.
10. Christian Reus-Smit, “Introduction,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. C.
Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.
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Meanwhile, when there are incompatible political realities and
material inconsistencies, visionary leaders, political entrepreneurs,
or the epistemic community would attempt to re-align norm sys-
tems through argumentation and discursive reasoning to persuade
others to reset the social fabric of the international community.
The reiterated interactions between international actors, either
state or non-state actors, shows why emerging legal rules and social
norms are required.  These rules and norms eventually constitute
actors’ behaviors, identities, and interests.11  In essence, those
seemingly immutable rules and norms are still subject to circum-
stantial changes of power distribution among international actors,
which strategize and bargain to revise the rules of the game for a
preferable outcome.12
By transcending the distribution of material power and inter-
ests among states, constructivists highlight the social power of the
state to “denaturalize” previous beliefs and “sensitize” a new idea
or emerging norm to resolve inconsistencies among competing so-
cial constructs at home and abroad.13  Such a reconstruction process
has been periodically evidenced in China’s past.  For example, the
definition of “China” as a state and the identity of being “Chinese”
have been through a constant process of construction, contestation,
and re-construction in shared subjective understandings throughout
China’s historical past due to shifting cultural, political, and social
contexts.  Here Lucian Pye once contended, “China is a civilization
pretending to be a state.”14  National identity has been broadly de-
fined, sometimes even ephemerally, by national narratives that can
be selective and tendentious, if necessary.  The same applies to the
modification of international law and normative understandings in
areas such as human rights, humanitarian law, climate change, and
humanitarian relief.  These formerly impermeable issues, due to
11. Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’:
Richer Views of Law and Politics,” International Organization, 55(3), 2001, 743-758.
12. Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Appraising the Methods of In-
ternational Law: A Prospectus for Readers,” American Journal of International Law,
93(2), 1999, 294; Myers S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, “The Prescribing Func-
tion in World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made,” Yale Studies in
World Public Order, 6(2), 1980, 269. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 2661, Yale Law
School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1-1-1980. <digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_pa
pers/2661>.
13. David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, International Law and In-
ternational Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 104-110.
14. Lucian Pye, “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,” Foreign Affairs, 69(4),
1990, 58.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\14-1\AOP101.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-MAR-14 15:07
THE MUTUAL NON-DENIAL PRINCIPLE 9
strict adherence to the supremacy of state sovereignty, have been
through recent landscape modifications in institutional accountabil-
ity, implementation, and enforcement with assistance from IGOs
and NGOs.  In fact, these institutions have been significant movers
and shakers in information dissemination, agenda setting, monitor-
ing, governance, rule enforcement, and compliance consolidation.
Cogent participation of various state and non-state actors strength-
ens institutional authority and efficiency in the world community.
Therefore, any major power intending to assert its influence
would consider all theoretical approaches as valuable and compati-
ble complements to cross theoretical divides whenever synthesizing
them appears fruitful.  Sheer possession of coercive power requires,
in Gramsci’s keen observation, a cultural hegemony that leads the
subaltern to perceive the world through an ideological perspective
set up by great powers.  The subtle proposition and propagation of
such a world-view offers an underlying institutional framework for
state and non-state actors to relate and react to each other within
the global order.  In this case, major powers would use international
institutions as socializing agents to legitimize what the world is sup-
posed to be and what an enduring order is likely to be.  A combina-
tion, rather than a confrontation, of various approaches helps
international institutions overcome collective action problems, nur-
ture shared values and norms, and offers assistance to those less
vocal and less represented in international politics.15
Fifth, with the synthesis of the liberal vision and constructive
approach, power politics should be included, rather than discred-
ited, in institutional designs.  A stronger state wishing to have a
favorable institutional order would try to “rope in” and “lock in” as
many state actors as possible for rule compliance, policy monitoring
and enforcement, and political efficacy.  Such an exercise of power
would signify authority and command in different genres, topics,
and styles of discursive argumentation and dialogues.16  The inclu-
sion of more supportive participants benefits and legitimizes the
major power’s vision and authority through a gentle soft power
presentation, rather than a brutal hard power coercion.  Certainly,
15. Randall L. Schweller and David Preiss, “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding
the Institutions Debate,” Mershon International Studies Review, 41, 1997, 1-32; Kelly-
Kate S. Pease, International Organizations (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012), 5th ed., 69-
72; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs,
87(1), 2008, 23-37.
16. Tuena A. van Dijk, “Structures of Discourse, Structures of Power,” in Commu-
nication Yearbook, 12, ed. J.A. Anderson (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 29-30.
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such a strategy requires the strong state to undercut some of its own
privileges, rights, and voting powers stipulated in the institutional
rules.  Under greater pressure for long-term stability, the strong
state is hence “strained” to conform to those rules of conduct stipu-
lated by institutional rules jointly consented to by all parties.17
Stated differently, a strong state relinquishing some of its perks, and
restraining itself from exercising its preponderant privilege, makes
it more desirable for weaker counterparts to participate in institu-
tional activities.  As Ikenbery succinctly demonstrated, the more
the strong state can deliberately restrain its exercise of power and
credibly commit itself to an institutional bargain, the more likely its
weaker counterparts will be interested in pursuing and being bound
by such an institutional deal.18
The same can be applied in China’s power ascent in interna-
tional institutions as well as its dealing with Taiwan in cross-Strait
relations.  As long as the stronger state skillfully manages the cross-
Strait relations, the stickiness of bilateral institutional arrangements
will produce favorable benefits to the stronger state without the
huge cost of enforcement.  Repeated interactions virtually recon-
struct a reciprocal relationship between both parties in terms of
their expectations and behaviors.  Hence, a successful institutional
framework minimizes fears, uncertainties, and malign intents en-
gendered by the anarchic nature of interstate relations on the one
hand, and maximizes the possibility of cooperation and reconcilia-
tion between actors for stable security and the supply of collective
goods on the other.
For countries with a volatile relationship, like Taiwan and
China, international institutions offer the potential to reverse or al-
leviate the frequent security dilemmas for those countries.  At the
same time, in light of accelerating globalization, increased democra-
tization, and the trans-nationalistic nature of global issues, states
have relied on the expanding networks of knowledge and action to
tackle issues beyond national boundaries in a multilateral manner.19
17. Bruce Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony,” European Journal of International
Relations, 7(1), 2001, 103-130.
18. G. John Ikenberry, “State Power and the Institutional Bargain,” in US Hegem-
ony and International Organizations, ed. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and
Michael Mastanduno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49-70.
19. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global
Civil Society.” Millennium, 21(3), 1992, 389-420; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sik-
kink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mariya Y.
Omelicheva, “Global Civil Society and Democratization of World Politics,” Interna-
tional Studies Review, 11, 2009, 109-132.
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The inclusion, rather than exclusion, of parties in dispute within in-
ternational institutions virtually bypasses political stalemates in
favor of seeking solutions through international forums.
III. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE MUTUAL
NON-DENIAL PRINCIPLE IN
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
The advocacy of the mutual non-denial principle adheres to the
theoretical stipulations of various paradigms and seeks to find a
pathway for cross-Strait conflict resolutions.  The cross-Strait spa-
tial division and military tension during the Cold War solidified Tai-
wan and China into two separate ideological spheres and divergent
political operating systems.
The increasing speed and enlarged scope of socio-economic ex-
changes across the Strait have intensified people’s self-awareness of
locality and identity different from each other, and prompted the
strenuous efforts of Taiwan-first fundamentalists to resist the pull-
ing force of China’s unification efforts.  In the 1990s the Taiwanese
resistance to China’s drive towards unification prompted a nativity
moment for Taiwan’s independent statehood detached from
China’s governance.  As a result, the multiplicity of cross-Strait ex-
changes has not mitigated political differences between the two
sides.  Instead, those differences are so real and basic that there is
no foreseeable remedy for political integration for people advocat-
ing Taiwan’s uniqueness and autonomy in governance.
Even for people acknowledging Taiwan’s historical and cul-
tural links to China, concerns over the loss of Taiwan’s identity and
democratic values have raised concerns regarding the negative con-
sequences of integration with China.  In light of the cross-Strait po-
litical stalemate, the mutual non-denial principle denotes a
moderate proposal of desensitizing political controversy and soften-
ing the strong stances taken by both parties due to national identity,
sovereignty demands, and internal domestic pressures.  The mutual
non-denial principle is thus presented to facilitate beneficial condi-
tions for cross-Strait reconciliation and to sustain Taiwan’s domestic
and international maneuverability in the future.
On various occasions, Ma states that, under the current ROC’s
constitutional framework, both Taiwan and China are part of the
ROC’s territorial domain.  The legal difficulty and political sensitiv-
ity in redrawing the ROC territorial boundary have made constitu-
tional revision a very remote possibility in Taiwan.  Hence, Ma has
claimed that the relations between Taiwan and China should not be
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treated as a state-to-state relationship, but as a “special relationship
for which the model of recognition under conventional interna-
tional law is not applicable,” meaning that mutual recognition of
each side’s statehood is impossible legally and politically.  Under
this scenario, each party should not deny the reality of the other
party’s authority of effective governance in separate territories
under their respective controls.  As Ma put it, “mutual non-denial”
means that “the two sides do not recognize each other’s sover-
eignty, nor do they deny each other’s authority to govern.”20  The
principle actually carries multiple promises and implications.
First, this principle can be conceived as a referential extension
of the cross-Strait “1992 Consensus”—“one China with respective
interpretation.”  As long as the essence of “one China” is upheld in
a broad scope, each side’s political authority of governance and le-
gitimacy of representation should be acknowledged mutually in ac-
cordance with its own designated political rules.  Ma’s realist
approach not only strives for peaceful coexistence to accommodate
the current situation of separation, but also seeks a normative ori-
entation within the broad realm of the “one China” principle to
nurture a friendly cross-Strait atmosphere.  It is a compromising
and practical approach to seeking and cultivating a win-win situa-
tion for reconciliation.  Ma’s adoption of the mutual non-denial pol-
icy actually has diminished the likelihood of Taiwan’s independence
and expresses his intent to seek a conciliatory approach to cross-
Strait relations.21
Second, in contrast to previous Taiwanese governments’ active
push for indigenous identity and international recognition of state-
hood, this principle creates a modus vivendi to maintain the current
collegial spirit and prevent  both sides from deteriorating to one of
confrontation a la pre-2008.  It permits both sides to “agree to disa-
gree” in terms of Taiwan’s international status in order to increase
the pace and speed of cross-Strait political interactions.  Its purpose
is to signify the static differences between Taiwan and China to bet-
ter search for flexibility in international participation.  As long as
one party does not deny the other’s “authority to govern” — the
“internal” face of sovereignty as the first step for cross-Strait rap-
prochement — Taiwan’s “external sovereignty” in the international
20. “Major Policies of ROC,” National Security Bureau, Taiwan. <www.nsb.gov.tw/
En/page13_01.htm>.  This principle has been expressed at different occasions.
21. Lori Fisler Darmrosch, Louis Henkin, Sean Murphy, and Hans Smit, Interna-
tional Law: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 2009), 5th edition,
343.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\14-1\AOP101.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-MAR-14 15:07
THE MUTUAL NON-DENIAL PRINCIPLE 13
community can be resolved through negotiations and
compromises.22
Sovereignty should not be an impenetrable shield that deprives
any political entity from responding to the needs of its population.
Rather, political entities who are associated with the international
society in an equitable arrangement should be allowed to fulfill the
basic functions of securing internal peace and stability, ensuring re-
spect for human rights, and maintaining good governance through
the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms utilized by the IGOs
and NGOs.  After all, no political entity can be out of bounds with
peremptory norms (ins cogens), laws, and rules established by inter-
national institutions.23  The mutual non-denial principle is a way to
place Taiwan within the orbit of international governance in its in-
teractions with other states.  For instance, when UN members ac-
tively supported China’s replacement of Taiwan on the issue of
representation in the UN, one argument was that the denial of the
Chinese government’s right of UN representation virtually de-
prived more than, at the time, 600 million Chinese people of their
rights in international participation.24  Following the same logic, the
mutual non-denial principle aims to offer the 23 million people of
Taiwan the equivalent rights of representation and participation in
global policies over their own lives without the shield of state
recognition.
Third, although names and titles are significant in representa-
tion and legitimacy, the mutual non-denial principle first empha-
sizes the construction of shared values, mutual understanding, and
habits of collaboration, and changes in those elements.  Echoing
DENG Xiaoping’s frequent reference of “letting future generations
use their wisdom to resolve thorny political controversies,” the mu-
tual non-denial principle is partially a wait-and-see attitude to per-
mit both sides to accept the status quo — the current reality of
22. According to Krasner, Taiwan undoubtedly possesses domestic sovereignty, but
may lack substantial international legal sovereignty.  See Stephen D. Krasner, “The Du-
rability of Organized Hypocrisy,” in Sovereignty in Fragments, ed. Hent Kalmo and
Quentin Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 101.
23. Bernd Ladwig and Beate Rudolf, “International legal and Moral Standards of
Good Governance in Fragial States,” Governance without a State? ed. Thomas Risse
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 199-201.
24. Regarding the representation issue of China, please see A. LeRoy Bennet and
James K. Oliver, International Organizations (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
2002), 85-91; N. D. White, The Law of International Organizations (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1996), 67; Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 116, 126-129, .
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separate authority in territorial governance — and expect incre-
mental and favorable political benefits derived from frequent inter-
actions.  The goal is to lay out an atmospheric framework in a
distinctive fashion in communicating the basis of each side’s prefer-
ences to a broader audience and a less cumbersome style of discur-
sive exchanges for political practitioners.  Through time, both sides
can gain time to rewind previous hostile mindsets and reformulate
historical understandings.25  In this case, it allows China to deliber-
ate under what conditions, within what environment, and by what
processes both sides can peacefully reach an equitable solution.
The same applies to a divided society like Taiwan, which has been
tormented by identity disputes over the past two decades.  Serving
as a socializing mechanism, this principle grants both governments
the time and space to convince relevant audiences to embark on the
reformulation of social constructs in plotting future cross-Strait
relations.26
Fourth, although it is inconceivable to achieve mutual recogni-
tion of sovereignty under current conventional international laws,
the non-denial of each side’s authority in governance offers an op-
portunity for both to search for an alternate and reasonable ar-
rangement for Taiwan’s participation in IGOs and NGOs.  This
would narrow international institutions’ jurisdictional gap in policy
enforcement and balance such organizations’ democratic deficits in
interest representation on issues related to the global commons
without being tangled in the strait jacket of the Westphalian defini-
tion of sovereignty.27  Rather than adhering to a strict binary of ex-
clusion versus recognition, this principle signals an explicit
acknowledgement of each side’s temporal and spatial authority and
control with a tint of not denying Taiwan’s political existence within
the “one-China” zone of inclusion.  The underpinning is that “there
can be, in principle, a meeting of the minds.  I can appeal to your
reason and try to persuade you, applying standards of logic and evi-
dence that both of us are committed to by the very fact that we are
25. Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” in The Politics of In-
ternational Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 40-41.
26. For the concept of securitization and de-securitization, please see Barry Buzan,
Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 4, 23-24.
27. Kenneth W. Abbott, “Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law
and Policy,” Journal of International Law and International Relations, 9, 2004-2005, 33.
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both reasoning being.”28  Motivated by the logical consequence of
the expansion of Taiwan’s international space, this principle seeks
an alternative strategy to untangle Westphaslian sovereignty, and at
the same time to fulfill the logic of appropriateness for Taiwan’s
genuine right of association with international society.29
Fifth, the principle is an example of the contribution of the epi-
stemic community by scholars like Hungdah CHIU, Yung WEI,
and others for a realistic approach to cross-Strait disputes.30  These
visions and proposals generated by the epistemic community, per-
mitting both sides to be flexible in domestic maneuvering but not
deviating from the one China principle, were also shared by Ma in
his earlier writings prior to his ascension to the presidency.31  The
distinctive, emerging epistemic community composed of profes-
sional experts in specific fields, for example climate change and
human rights, has played various roles (adviser, advocator, and ad-
judicator) for new policies and solutions in knowledge provision,
problem solving, and principle setting.  The mutual non-denial prin-
ciple is undoubtedly an attempt initiated by the epistemic commu-
nity of professionals to iron out differences for better management
of cross-Strait relations.
The mutual non-denial principle illustrates how different
voices can be accommodated and implies how various aspects of
world politics are interrelated.  As Ju¨rgen Habermas amplified the
utility of “communicative action,” “speech acts,” and systems of
symbols:32
. . .a communication in which grammatical sentences are
embedded, by way of universal validity claims, in three re-
lations to reality, thereby assuming the corresponding
pragmatic functions of representing facts, establishing le-
28. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 182.
29. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 70-71.
30. For Prof. Hungdah Chiu’s contributions, please see essays by Su Chi and others
in the special issue of Maryland Journal of International Law, 27, 2012, in memory of
Prof. Chiu. Similar views can be found in Yung Wei, From “Multi-System Nations” to
“Linkage Communities”. Occasional Papers/Reprints Series. Contemporary Asian
Studies, No.1, 1998 (144).
31. Ying-jeou Ma, “Cross-Strait Relations at a Crossroad: Impasse or Break-
through?” in Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse, ed. Donald S. Zagoria (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2003), 58.
32. Ju¨rgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1979), 67.
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gitimate interpersonal relations, and expressing one’s own
subjectivity. According to this model, language can be
conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for
every successful communicative action there exists a
threefold relation between the utterance and (a) “the ex-
ternal world” as the totality of existing states of affairs, (b)
“our social world” as the totality of all normatively regu-
lated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a
given society, and (c) “a particular inner work” (of the
speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences.
Consequently, the discourse of mutual non-denial intends to form
shared understandings of the “external world” of the factual sepa-
ration between Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) and a regulated
“social world” full of dignity, equality, and reciprocity in cross-
Strait interactions even in an objective power asymmetry.  Most im-
portantly, Taiwan, the “engaged speaker,” is able to connect to and
take up an international relationship in scope and scale.33  In Georg
Simmel’s analysis, the utterance of this “speech act” — “mutual
non-denial” principle — relies on the ideas of fairness and legiti-
macy to guide the behaviors of both sides to turn mutual apprehen-
sion and repulsion derived from past separation and “strangeness”
into gestures of social inclusion and non-subordination for possible
integration.34
If one agrees with Foucault, then the epistemic community
hopes that discourses represent not simply a composite system of
meaning and authority, a reflection of the belief and intention of
the initiator, but also an action plan to receive positive response
from the audience for specific meaningful results.  The fulfillment
of Taiwan’s proposal of the mutual non-denial principle still re-
quires reciprocal acts from the respondent, China.35
Sixth, the sensibility of the mutual non-denial principle still re-
lies on the stronger party’s willingness to chip and constrain West-
phalian sovereignty in a context of power disparity.  Even
Ikenberry, an advocate for liberal world order, admits that institu-
tional rules have to contain “escape clauses, weighted voting, opt-
out agreements, and veto rights” to accommodate the stronger po-
litico-military power’s interests and to minimize “its exposure to
33. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 63.
34. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated and edited by Kurt
H Wolf (New York: Free Press, 1950), 275-279, 405-407.
35. van Dijk, “Structures of Discourse, Structures of Power,” 19-21.
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sovereignty-reduction commitments” in the agreement.36  Even so,
the mutual non-denial principle is an opportunity for China, the
stronger party, to adjust its strategic pose to allure Taiwan, the
weaker counterpart, into a desirable arrangement.  The principle
also sidesteps the issue of sovereignty within the one-China realm
drawn up by China to coexist and to gain governance autonomy as
much as possible.
The idea of mutual non-denial has its precedential value for
emulation, though understandably the cross-Strait context is differ-
ent from the relationship between the two Germanys prior to unifi-
cation.  Still, the intentional non-specification of status between the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) has been a useful analogy for functional coexis-
tence between the two Germanys.  Like the 1972 Treaty on the Ba-
sis of Inter-German Relations (the Basic Treaty) between the FRG
and the GDR, which acknowledged the literal non-representation
of the other in the international sphere with the notion of “Ger-
many as a whole,” the mutual non-denial principle strives to
achieve a similar condition.37  In execution, both Germanys exer-
cised discursive innovation by using “permanent missions,” not
“embassies,” and in each’s “government’s seat” rather than
“capitals,” to facilitate the special bilateral relationship and to per-
form its administration within the mutually “respected,” not “rec-
ognized,” area of governance.  And just as in Germany’s situation,
here the purpose is to reconstruct a common historical understand-
ing, cultural identity, and social unity to reinforce preferential con-
ditions for both sides to decide a best route for unification when the
opportunity arises.  Since each German state claimed to be the rep-
resentative of the German nation, bilateral hostility was mitigated
with a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the other Ger-
many.38  The notion of a “special” inter-German (or intra-German)
36. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation
of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 86, 306.
37. 12 ILM 16 Art. 6. James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 138.
38. See the Basic Treaty, December 21, 1972, Art. 2 and Art. 8.  For analysis, please
see Shaocheng Tan, “A Comparison between Intra-German Relations in the 1970s and
Cross-Strait Relations Since 2008,” Issues and Studies, 46(1), 2010, 10. Chun-I Chen,
“Legal Aspects of Mutual Non-Denial and the Relations Across the Taiwan Strait,”
Maryland Journal of International Law, 27, 2012, 123; Derek J. Vanderwood, “The Ko-
rean Reconciliation Treaty and the German Basic Treaty,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy
Journal, 2(2), 1993, 411-432.  Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy
under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State,” in State Sovereignty as
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relation is an example for the resolution of cross-Strait impasse in
status designation of both sides.  This illustration assists to smooth
interactions in low politics issue areas with transnational character-
istics.  Following the German model, the mutual non-denial princi-
ple accepts the temporal division of “China” into two entities under
the shared identity of “China.”  The recent cross-Strait efforts to
establish liaison offices in each side without referring to national
titles and flags, along with quasi-privileges granted in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, is a valuable replica of the two-
Germany experience.
Such a “special cross-Strait relationship” with the mutual non-
denial principle embedded in practice has been applied in multiple
agreements signed by Taiwan and China.  For example, the Cross-
Strait Trade in Services Pact between the Taipei-authorized Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Beijing-designated Associa-
tion for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in June 21,
2013, is a concrete case of accepting each side’s authority to govern
in separate territorial arenas.39  On the surface, SEF and ARATS
have long served as quasi-official organizations to conceal actual
official exchanges.  Governmental officials have actually partici-
pated in bilateral negotiations as “advisers or consultants” of SEF
or ARATS not only to avoid political recognition of each side’s sov-
ereignty, but also to not deny the governing authority of each and
the impossibility of extending one’s legal authority to the other.
Stated differently, so far, all bilateral agreements completed by SEF
and ARATS rather than full-fledged government agencies, have
been virtually repeated acknowledgments of each side’s “internal”
sovereignty in substance and in formality.  Taken one step further,
the principles and rules of the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services also facilitates the negotiation of
the 2013 service pact.  It illustrates the utility of IGOs in creating a
win-win situation for service providers by toning down the sover-
eignty issue and nomenclature’s debates across the Strait.
Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 240-277, particularly 264-266.
39. “Trade in Services Pact to Boost Cross-Strait Ties,” Taiwan Today, June 21,
2013. <taiwantoday.tw/>.
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IV. TRUCE ON THE FRONT OF DIPLOMATIC
RECOGNITION
Since Taiwan’s loss of UN membership and China’s re-entry
into the international community in the 1970s, Taiwan’s evolving
international participation began to display several features.  First,
diplomatic ties with allies are sustained and consolidated through
“dollar diplomacy” by offering economic aid and technological as-
sistance to counter China’s aggressive move.  Second, if the sever-
ance of diplomatic ties is inevitable, unofficial ties are maintained
through “substantive diplomacy” (shizhi waijiao), in the areas of
technology, economics, trade, and cultural exchanges for active co-
operation and economic sustainability.  As long as countries are
willing to retain unofficial or quasi-official ties, Taiwan will try to
collaborate with host countries, whose names are mutually agreea-
ble, to ward off China’s objections utilizing the principle of “flexible
diplomacy” (tanxing waijiao).  This is exemplified by US-Taiwan re-
lations seen in the framework of the “unofficial” American Insti-
tute of Taiwan in the US and the Coordination Council for North
American Affairs (CCNAA) in Taiwan.  Third, the principle of flex-
ibility has been extended to Taiwan’s willingness to compromise
over the issue of nomenclatures in its participation with IGOs and
NGOs, since strenuous efforts to uphold its official title appears
unlikely.40
In the area of diplomatic relations with other countries, Tai-
wan’s proposal of a diplomatic truce (waijiao xiubing) has appeared
to receive tacit collaboration from China.  As long as neither side
takes action to win additional diplomatic recognition, Taiwanese
diplomatic allies have been relatively easier to sustain.  After all,
171 countries recognized China in 2008, compared to Taiwan’s cur-
rent number of 23 diplomatic allies, a drop from 71 in 1969.  Addi-
tional diplomatic recognition has given China no noticeable gain in
its global prestige, but has increased further resentment and frustra-
tion amongst Taiwanese people and politicians.  Thus, the number
of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies during Ma’s first term of presidency
(2008-2012) remained at 23 (the Vatican in Europe, 4 allies in Af-
rica, 6 in Oceania, and 12 in Central and South America).41  This
40. Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Brookfield, VT: Ash-
gate, 1998), 183-187.
41. For a list of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, please see Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. <www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Home/Index>.  Of course, there are downsides of
diplomatic truce.  See Le Guanghan, “Lianhe biji: shuzi zhong de anyu” (Lianhe Notes:
The Hidden Message of Numbers), United Daily, Taipei, July 3, 2012. <udn.com/NEWS/
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remarkable understanding between Taipei and Beijing moves away
from the confrontational diplomacy of the previous administration
to a diplomatic truce.  By doing so, China improves its image in
Taiwan and cultivates a better atmosphere in cross-Strait relations.
The announcement of a diplomatic truce also stops senseless, “dol-
lar diplomacy” cross-Strait bidding contests for diplomatic recogni-
tion by promising hefty financial aid packages to win new allies.  In
the past, some countries in Latin America, Africa, and Oceania
took advantage of cross-Strait rivalries to bargain for lucrative eco-
nomic resources for their financial and investment needs.
Obviously, one immediate benefit of this diplomatic ceasefire
is the reduction of the Taiwanese government’s “confidential” fund-
ing of its allies for the sustainability of diplomatic relations ($18
million in 2008 to $12 million in 2009).42  Although Taiwan’s use of
economic aid packages continue, downplaying the importance of
dollar diplomacy surely creates a mutual win-win situation; neither
Taiwan nor China needs to engage in a bidding war for diplomatic
competition, thus lowering the chances of being held hostage by an
ally’s unreasonable financial demands for recognition.  During his
presidential travels abroad, Ma has also kept a relatively low-profile
during his stopovers in the US in order to avoid unnecessary politi-
cal speculation by China and the US of using official visits to bran-
dish and promote Taiwan’s independent status in the world
economy.
Undoubtedly, Ma’s diplomatic initiative carries political risks
as China’s global economic and political power continues to rise
due to China’s charm offensive and energy investments in Africa,
Latin America, and other regions.  China securing resources, mar-
kets, and strategic influences, in said regions has caught the atten-
tion of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, who may consider switching
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China.  Since Ma’s inaugura-
tion in 2008, for example, several of Taiwan’s allies — El Salvador,
Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay —have felt the pinch of Taiwan’s
reluctance to meet excessive requests for foreign aid in order to
OPINION/X1/7199411.shtml>; Chen Yuren, “Liangan waijiao xiubing, wo bugan she
daibiaochu” (Diplomatic Truce Across Strait, We Don’t Dare to Set Up Unofficial Rep-
resentative Office) Apple Daily, July 2, 2012. <www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/arti-
cle/headline/20120702/34339474>. Gambia announced to cut off diplomatic ties with
Taiwan in November 2013, though China expressed little interest in recognition.
42. Shih-chung Liu, “Seeking a Cross-Strait Diplomatic Truce,” Center for North-
east Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Oct. 30, 2008, p. 7. <www.brookings
.edu/~/media/events/2008/10/30%20taiwan/1030_taiwan.pdf>.
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sustain diplomatic relations.  They then threatened to switch recog-
nition to China to test Taiwan’s will, but China has so far declined
their requests.  Since Taiwan’s change of guard in 2008, delicate
cross-Strait relations have gained higher priority than relations with
the prospective allies in Latin America.43  There are also examples
of mutual non-denial of each other’s representation when both
sides’ diplomats were present at the same public occasion without
official interactions in 2009.44  China’s acquiescence to a diplomatic
truce across the Strait has made the efforts of the abovementioned
countries  to switch recognition powerless.  Consequently, Hondu-
ras indicted its intent to open a trade office in China in December
2012.  In June 2013, Honduras took action to lower their diplomat’s
rank in Taiwan from envoy extraordinary to charge d’affaires in
Taipei to pressure Taiwan for aid.45  Several allies, such as Belize,
Haiti, Palau, Paraguay, and the Vatican followed suit and down-
graded the ranks of their respective diplomats stationed in Taiwan.
Should an ally of Taiwan eventually switch recognition from Taiwan
to China without any financial deals on the table, it will be a chal-
lenge for both China and Taiwan to cooperatively manage the
thorny issue,and avoid embarrassing Ma over his dedication to a
diplomatic truce, while also preventing other Taiwanese diplomatic
allies from following suit.
On the domestic front, Ma’s bold and unilateral move has en-
countered doubts, criticism, and resistance, particularly from the
opposing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and some
members of Ma’s own ruling party, the Nationalist Party (Kuomin-
tang, KMT).  Simply speaking, Ma’s rush into a unilateral diplo-
matic truce without a clear path forward might put Taiwan in the
worst possible outcome, with a hefty loss of diplomatic allies switch-
ing recognition, should China choose not to  cooperate.  In the crit-
ics’ views, the suspension of diplomatic bickering still requires a
soul-searching process to ask what the next step will be.
43. Joseph Yeh, “No Allies of Taiwan Meet with Xi on Diplomatic Trip to Carib-
bean: MOFA,” The China Post, June 7, 2013. <www.ChinaPost.com.tw>; “Wikileaks:
China Rejects Panama’s Wish for Ties,” Fox News, May 12, 2011. <www.foxnews.com>;
Kristina Kironska´, “Taiwan and Palau: How to Maintain This Diplomatic Alliance?”
Net Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1), June 2013, 11-23.
44. Fang Zhengxiang, “Liangan shijie tongtai wo bu beige” (Both Sides’ Delegates
Appeared on the Same Stage. We Do Not Protest), Liberty Times, Feb. 18, 2009.
45. Joseph Yeh, “Honduras Ambassador to Leave: MOFA,” China Post, June1,
2013. <www.chinapost.com.tw>. “Qi bangjiaoguo jin linshi daiban zhutai” (Seven Dip-
lomatic Allies Has Sent Charge d’affaires to Taiwan), Apple Daily, June 29, 2013. <www
.appledaily.com.tw>.
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Even so, the diplomatic ceasefire has appeared to hold up so
far without any surprises, though China has neither given its official
nod to Ma’s diplomatic initiative nor rejected his idea outright.
Both sides seem to have accepted and implemented this unspoken
understanding to end their counterproductive and resource-squan-
dering diplomatic tug-of-war.  On this aspect, Taiwan’s “good deed”
has received China’s reciprocal response in a tit-for-tat manner.
The interaction has cultivated an atmosphere of reconciliation for
trust-building in cross-Strait relations.  Undoubtedly, a diplomatic
truce is a subtle practice of the mutual non-denial principle insofar
as it quietly acknowledges each side’s diplomatic sphere and toler-
ates the other side’s non-political interactions in the host country.
The relative stability and success of Taiwan’s diplomatic rela-
tions has not been transposed to a broader access to and participa-
tion in IGOs, which still awaits China’s willingness to acquiesce to
Taiwan’s demands.  Taiwan’s participation in international organi-
zations has only shown a slight improvement during Ma’s first term
of presidency.  There is no more opportune time than the second
term of Ma’s presidency for both sides to search for a feasible solu-
tion to Taiwan’s international participation.
V. STATUS OF TAIWAN’S PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
When China (the People’s Republic of China, PRC) replaced
Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) in the UN in 1971, Taiwan
lost its membership in eight UN specialized agencies within two
years.  In 1966, Taiwan was a member of 39 IGOs, by 1977 that
number had dropped to ten. However, China’s membership in-
creased from one to 22 during the same period.  The situation fur-
ther deteriorated in the wake of the United States’ formal
recognition of the PRC in 1980.  Substantial losses included the de-
partures from those institutions within the Bretton Woods system,
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).46  In
1990, Taiwan’s IGO membership remained at ten.47  Those remain-
ing IGOs tended to be regional (e.g., Asian Productivity Organiza-
tion since 1961), financial (e.g., Asian Development Bank since
46. Chien-pin Li, “Taiwan’s Participation in Inter-Governmental Organizations.”
Asian Survey, 46(4), 2006, 597-614.
47. Hui-wan Cho, “China, Taiwan Co-representation in IGOs.” Quanqiu zhengzhi
pinglun (English title: Review of Global Politics), 26, 2009, 93-130.
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1966), and technical (e.g., International Seed Testing Association
since 1962) in nature.  China’s insistence on the “one China” princi-
ple with the PRC as the sole legitimate government in both IGOs
and INGOs practically blocked Taiwan’s every move to rejoin any
previously Taiwan-affiliated organization or new organization in
which China had become a member.
Taiwan also felt the heat of Chinese pressure in the sphere of
INGOs, where Taiwan hoped to retain its international identity.  In
1973, under pressure from China, the UN Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) delivered a request to all of
its then 319 affiliated NGOs to cut off any institutional ties with
Taiwan.48  By July 1975, 20 of the 37 INGOs that had institutional
associations with Taiwan had replied.  An overwhelming majority
refused to terminate their institutional ties with Taiwan by arguing
that political considerations should not interfere in the self-gov-
erning principle of non-political INGOs.49  Even so, the request for
all INGOs to terminate their institutional associations with Taiwan
remained an active agenda item in UNESCO meetings through the
late 1970s.50
China’s determination to smother Taiwan’s international space
in the circle of INGOs continued into the 1980s.  Undoubtedly, the
wish to have China within its organization led some INGOs to
search for an alternative option in resolving the Taiwan issue.
China usually demanded either ousting Taiwan or downgrading Tai-
wan’s membership status to regional representation in the INGO as
a precondition for China’s admission.  Taiwan’s desire to stay active
in international society prompted the search for a feasible solution
in the changing international political reality.  For example, Taiwan
48. UNESCO, “Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at Its
93rd Session, Paris, 12 September-11 October 1973,” UNESCO Executive Board, 93
EX/Decisions, Paris, November 9, 1973, 40; UNESCO, “Report of the Director-Gen-
eral on the Application of 93 EX/Decision 6.9,” UNESCO Executive Board, 94 EX/33,
Paris, February 20, 1974. Also see “Volume 1, Resolutions,” Records of the General
Conference, Eighteenth Session, UNESCO, Paris, October 17 to November 23, 1974, p.
84.
49. UNESCO, “The Question of International Non-Governmental Organizations
Maintaining Relations with UNESCO and in Which Bodies or Elements Linked with
Chiang Kai-shek Still Participate, Having Illegally Usurped the Name of China,”
UNESCO Executive Board, 98 EX/20, Paris, August 29, 1975.  NGOs’ refusal to follow
UNESCO’s request also appeared in the 1976 UNESCO Director-General’s report to
the Executive Board. Please see 100 EX/25 Paris, August 26, 1976.
50. UNESCO, “Volume I, Resolutions,” UNESCO, Records of the General Con-
ference, 20th Session, Paris Oct 24-  November 28, 1978, 115.
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boycotted the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York in
protest of the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) decision
that it could compete only under the name “Chinese Taipei”.  How-
ever, in 1981 Taiwan had no alternative but to accept this name to
attend the biggest international sporting events.  Another example
was the compromise Taiwan made to maintain its membership in
the international scientific community, accepting the title of “The
Academy of Sciences Located in Taipei, China” in exchange for
China’s acceptance of “The China Association for Science and
Technology, Beijing” in the International Council of Scientific Un-
ions in 1982.
In 1993, China further tightened its grip by permitting Taiwan’s
international participation only under the name “Taipei, China” or
“Taiwan, China,” thereby implying Taiwan as a sub-unit within
China’s political domain.  This declaration applied to a broad defi-
nition of “international gatherings.”  China reiterated a similar mes-
sage in its 2000 White Paper by declaring that that “Chinese Taipei”
is “only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a model ap-
plicable to other inter-governmental organizations or international
gatherings.”51  In other words, Taiwan’s nomenclature as “Chinese
Taipei” in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Inter-
national Olympics, and as “a separate customs territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” (“Chinese Taipei” in abbreviation) in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) should not be considered
precedent for future cases.  China was determined to grind to a halt
Taiwan’s attempt to maintain its profile in international participa-
tion.  Such a determination was written into China’s controversial
Anti-Secession Law in 2005, with provisions stipulating the employ-
ment of “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures”
against any Taiwanese attempt for formal independence by then
President CHEN Shui-bian and his pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party, though the law gave no clear thresholds warrant-
ing China’s military response.  With a proclamation that “both the
Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China,” the law reconfirms its
51. The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information office of the State Council,
PRC, “White Paper—The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,” August 1993,
<http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36704.htm>; The Taiwan
Affairs Office and the Information office of the State Council, PRC, “White Paper—
The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” February 21, 2000. <www.taiwandocu
ments.org/white.htm>.
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rejection of any interference by outside forces as an apparent refer-
ence to Washington’s intervention.52
In China’s view, its adamant adherence to the one-China prin-
ciple is based on its own interpretation of the 1992 Consensus,
“yizhong gebiao” (that is, there is “one China,” but each side
reserves the right to interpret the political contents of “one
China”), a mutual understanding reached by SEF and ARATS in
Hong Kong in 1992.  Taiwan is eager to keep a broad and open
interpretation of “China,” according to each side’s political neces-
sity and domestic constraints, in order to expand and thicken cross-
Strait interactions prior to serious political dealings.  The mutual
non-denial principle allows space for each side’s preference on the
meaning of “China,” with Taiwan’s reading as the “Republic of
China” in full name and China’s claim of “China” being the “Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.”  Still, the spirit of “each according to its
needs” on the meaning of “China” contained in the 1992 consensus
has not placated the anxieties and frustrations of Taiwan’s pro-inde-
pendence supporters.  On the contrary, China has frequently touted
the importance of “yizhong” (“one China”), while deliberately ig-
noring the phrase “gebiao” (“separate interpretation”) to uphold its
sole representation and legitimacy of the whole China.  In fact,
China seldom reiterates the whole phrase “yizhong gebiao” in ref-
erence to the 1992 Consensus.  Whenever the PRC confirms its en-
thusiastic adherence to the 1992 Consensus, the official declaration
of “one China” (yizhong) is vividly pronounced, with the second
part of the phrase, gebiao, barely mentioned.53
The PRC’s adamant stance on the “one China” principle has
shut off any of Taiwan’s IGO application attempts.  China’s force-
ful, repeated, and unequivocal assertions of the PRC as the sole
proprietary owner of “China” have cultivated and further consoli-
dated an international identity construct that the PRC is the one
and only political entity to assume the name of “China”; the “Re-
public of China” in Taiwan, or, the “other China,” should have no
52. Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the 3rd Session of the
10th National People’s Congress, March 13, 2005. <english.people.com.cn/200503/14/
eng20050314_176746.html>.
53. See the speech by Li Yafei, China’s Vice President of China’s Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the counterpart of Taiwan’s Straits Ex-
change Foundation (SEF), <video.chinatimes.com/video-bydate-cnt.aspx?cid=1&nid=
35720>.  Also, Shiquan Xu, “The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Con-
sultations Between the Association for Relations Acroskks the Taiwan Strait and the
Straits Exchange Foundation,” Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Breaking the China-Taiwan Im-
passe, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 82-83.
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legitimacy in using “China” in any international attribution.  The
PRC automatically presents itself as the epitome of “China” in in-
ternational media through years of propagation in press circulation
and official exchanges without further explanation.  The Cold War
era distinction of two Chinas (that is, China being classified as the
ROC in Taiwan versus the PRC in mainland China, or “free China”
in Taiwan versus “Communist China” as the PRC) has dissipated in
recent international politics.  The marginalization of the ROC as
the symbol of “China” naturally has forced Taiwan to seek an alter-
native identity for distinction in international representation.
The PRC initiated a lengthy diplomatic battle to compete for
the exclusive use of the name “China” in all political references
during the two Chiangs’ era (Presidents CHIANG Kai-shek and
CHIANG Ching-kuo) in the 1970s and 1980s.  As a result, the
PRC’s scorched-earth diplomacy against Taiwan’s use of the name
“China” finally gained a sizable victory to become the sole identity
representation of “China.”  At the same time, China’s refusal to
allow Taiwan to co-share the reference of “China” (in a way similar
to the two-Germany and the two-Korea models) gave pro-indepen-
dence Taiwanese political elites, such as LEE Teng-hui, a handy op-
portunity to proclaim and preach their ideas for a separate identity
from China in the international landscape for differentiation and
survival.  Such advocacy for a new, discernible identity also served
Taiwan’s political elites’ interests to push for Taiwanese indigenous
identity for mass mobilization to capture the lion’s share of the
Taiwanese voters in support of Taiwan’s democratic transition from
a China-centered authoritarian regime to a pluralist democracy.
Consequently, the massive domestic awakening to different-ness
precipitated by a series of deliberate government-led social recon-
struction programs of de-Chineseness within Taiwan eventually
translated into repeated callings for separate-ness from “China” to
manifest Taiwan’s own indigenous identity in the 1990s and early
2000s.54  In the words of John R. Gillis, “Identities and memories
are not things we think about, but things we think with” (original
54. Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement,” Issues and Stud-
ies 41(1), March 2005, 1-51; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Beijing’s Security Behavior in the
Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?” Rethinking Security in East Asia, J. J. Suh,
Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carson, ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2004), 65.
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emphasis) in internal politicking and external operation.55  In es-
sence, the old basis of China-oriented national identity were under-
mined and transformed into a Taiwan-centered one to fit the
beginning of a new era of democracy, though it encountered resis-
tance in the domestic arena and external sphere.
Taiwanese politicians’ increasingly bold requests for an indige-
nous identity resulted in cross-Strait tensions and disrupted the tri-
angular relationship between the US, China, and Taiwan.  Taiwan’s
annual campaign for UN recognition as a legitimate political entity
started in 1993 and increasingly picked up steam through various
domestic political campaigns, becoming more and more pugnacious
in international discursive arguments for UN membership.  Eventu-
ally, these efforts encountered UN Secretary General BAN Ki-
moon’s refusal in 2007 on the grounds that the 1971 UN General
Assembly Resolution 2758 states that the UN decided to “restore
all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate represent-
atives of China to the United Nations.”56
Despite the UN’s rejection, Taiwan’s President CHEN Shui-
bian remained committed to putting forward a referendum on Tai-
wan’s UN membership as an electioneering agenda to broaden his
support base in the 2008 presidential campaign.  Such political ma-
neuvering surely generated a political storm and domestically rup-
tured the social fabric of national identity.  It also seriously strained
Taiwan’s relationship with both the US and China, as sensational
and populist slogans in severe electoral campaigns could slip into a
serious crusade toward the ultimate goal of Taiwanese indepen-
dence.  The developing tension only reinforced China’s conviction
to thwart any of Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts in IGOs and even Tai-
wan’s participation in INGOs.57  The PRC’s staunch position in
monopolizing the “China” nomenclature coincided with the
marginalization of Taiwan’s international status, readily prompted
Taiwan’s withdrawal from any reference to “China,” and precipi-
55. John R. Gillis, “Introduction: Memory and Identity,” in Commemorations: The
Politics of National Identity, ed., John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), 5.
56. UNGA Resolution, “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic
of China in the United Nations,” 1976th Plenary Meeting, Oct. 25, 1971.
57. Sigrid Winkler, “Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be,” Taiwan-US
Quarterly Analysis, no. 9, June 2012. <www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/
20-taiwan-un-winkler>.
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tated Taiwan’s intransigent quest – stronger than before – for alter-
native options to sustain its international status.
According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June
2013, Taiwan is a member of 53 IGOs, including 33 full member-
ships, 16 observerships, two associate memberships, one corre-
sponding membership, and one cooperating non-membership
separately.58  Among these IGOs, Taiwan joined ten of them by
1988.  The number rose to 30 by the end of 2000.  Then, prior to
Ma’s inauguration in 2008, Taiwan’s total IGO participation stood
at 47.  By mid-2013, Ma’s government achieved admission to six ad-
ditional IGOs.  The numerical increase could be considered a nor-
mal result of attempts to harness the trends of accelerated
globalization, trade expansion, and economic growth, as well as a
reaction to internal initiatives empowered by its democratic transi-
tion since the late 1980s, the desire to propagate Taiwanese indige-
nous identity outward, and a booming civil society anxious to
engage international society.  IGOs and INGOs have become cru-
cial venues for Taiwan to sustain its international status amid
China’s diplomatic encirclement of Taiwan, to communicate with
China in international forums without serious domestic quibbles,
and to network with countries without official diplomatic ties.  One
noticeable point is that Taiwan’s numerical increase in IGOs after
2008 is actually less phenomenal than one would expect in light of
the significant improvement of cross-Strait relations; even though
the Chinese government under the previous leader HU Jintao and
current XI Jinping has indicated several times that rational and rea-
sonable arrangements (heqing heli de anpai) will be made for Tai-
wan’s requests to have a legitimate role in international
participation.  In other words, the expectation to see a cascading
increase in IGO membership after Ma’s extraordinary efforts to-
ward reconciliation with China and supporting the 1992 Consensus
appeared to be overly assumed.  One explanation is, of course, that
58. The rights and duties of each class of IGO membership other than full member-
ship may differ between organizations and even from one member to another member
in the same organization.  Usually, all these non-full members do not have the right of
voting.  For example, Art. 2, para. 11 of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of UN, an associate member is a political entity that is responsible for the
territory’s international relations.  Then, Art. 3, para. 1 of the FAO constitution states
that an associate member shall not hold office or have the right of voting.  Again, ob-
servers cannot vote, though the rights and privileges of observer vary in different orga-
nizations.  For a brief discussion of different classes of membership, see Jan Klabbers,
An Introduction to International Institutional Law (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 111-114.
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China is concerned with the possibility of Taiwan reversing its
course of action under a pro-independence party, the DPP, should
the voters choose a regime change in the future.
Even so, it is an indisputable fact that Taiwan’s recent flexibil-
ity in arrangements, public sentiment for reconciliation, and shifting
discourse in reasoning for international participation offer China an
opportunity.  China can consolidate its core interest — the one
China principle — by promoting Taiwan’s international participa-
tion based on skillful institutional arrangements under the mutual
non-denial principle.  An examination of Taiwan’s record in the
past two decades reveals several discernible features of Taiwan’s re-
lentless diplomatic efforts to maintain its participation in the inter-
national community.
A. IGOs for Taiwan’s International Functionality and
Sustainability
Most of the IGOs in which Taiwan participates concentrate on
low-politics, technical, and functional areas.  Realizing the difficulty
in joining high-politics IGOs on issues of security and military, Tai-
wan focuses on the pursuit of low-politics IGOs in areas of agricul-
tural collaboration, banking, economic cooperation, public health,
resource conservation and management, and international stan-
dards in technology and information transmission.  These IGOs are
essential to Taiwan’s continuous prosperity, sustainability, and func-
tionality as a viable international player.  These low-politics IGOs
usually welcome non-sovereign state actors to meet the constant
challenge of globalization.  For instance, with many Taiwanese fish-
ing fleets cruising the different maritime zones of the world, several
regional fishing regimes have been quite receptive to, including Tai-
wan better conservation and management of fish stocks in the re-
gion.  As a substantial economy in East Asia and a significant
manufacturer in select industries, Taiwan’s membership in several
functional IGOs in banking and technical codes not only helps Tai-
wan comply with global standards and rules for its economic sus-
tainability, financial integrity, and trade expansion, but also allows
IGOs to prevent the possibility of free riders within their realms of
governance.59  In light of the axiom “disease knows no state bound-
ary,” Taiwan’s association with the World Health Assembly (WHA)
59. Cheri Attix, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan’s Trading
Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?” California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal, 25, 1994-95, 357-387.
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in 2009 benefits the global health network for seamless coverage
against a pandemic crisis after a series of application failures in Tai-
wan in 1997, 2005, and 2007 respectively.  Taiwan’s repeated appli-
cations for WHA membership is a vivid example of China’s veto
power, though the US, Japan, and the European Union supported
Taiwan’s entry into WHA.
In addition, Taiwan’s democratization, national wealth, and
flexible diplomacy in the 1990s helped Taiwan gain admission to
some IGOs whose mission and function might not fit well into
China’s national interests.  For example, Taiwan joined the Associa-
tion of Asian Election Authorities in 1998, when China was still
considering how to extend election mechanisms upward from vil-
lage elections to various levels of government.  Taiwan participated
in the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units of the World
in 1998 to ensure good governance for crimes such as money laun-
dering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, while China’s
absence was understandable in light of its challenging task of avoid-
ing any unpleasant expose´ of rampant corruption scandals inside
the country.  China’s reluctance to join organizations like the
Egmont Group gave Taiwan an opportunity to seek admission.
Taiwan also increased its IGO membership in the 1990s and
2000s through its participation in some IGOs that have emanated
from a “parent” IGO.60  For example, the World Customs Organi-
zation has several spin-offs, such as the Technical Committee on
Customs Valuation and the Technical Committee on Rules of Ori-
gin, both of which Taiwan has joined.  The technical and functional
characteristics of these spin-off IGOs provide major states with lit-
tle room for power politics and tend to be more conducive than
their parent organizations in their constitutional requirements of
membership and operational regulations.  This is one category of
IGOs that Taiwan may be able to explore and expand into further
in the future.
Taiwan’s expansion of international space also benefited from
the proliferation of Taiwanese INGOs, such as the Tzu Chi (Ciji)
Foundation.  These INGOs serve as “the nexus of the global and
the local,” as Huang described, free from most political constraints
in international politics for the supply and demand of global public
60. For an excellent analysis of Taiwan’s membership in these IGO’s spin-off orga-
nizations, please see Chien-pin Li, “Taiwan’s Participation in Inter-Governmental
Organizations.”
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goods.61  Their outreach efforts have become a societal response to
overcoming Taiwan’s ambiguous international identity in global
politics, though it does not mean their operation is unobstructed by
political consideration.  That being said, these INGOs still cannot
substitute the IGO’s functionality in contemporary international
relations.
B. Get in First and See What to Do Next: Pragmatism in
Membership Application
China’s position has been a critical factor affecting Taiwan’s
efforts to expand its international space.  In order to gain entry to
additional IGOs in the future, Taiwan is fully aware of the possibil-
ity of “second-class citizen” status in membership and organiza-
tional functionality.  Taiwan’s policy orientation towards flexibility
and pragmatism in the wake of Taiwan’s democratic transition has
facilitated its negotiations towards IGO membership.  For example,
when a targeted IGO encounters China’s coercive pressures, and no
sufficient support of current members can prevail over China’s op-
position, Taiwan is often willing to make concessions and take on a
participatory role rather than “sovereign state” membership with-
out seriously affecting national pride and dignity.  Thus, on Tai-
wan’s list of 53 IGOs, 20 of them are listed under observer status,
associate member, corresponding member, and cooperating non-
member.  Even for those IGOs listed in the category of “full mem-
ber,” Taiwan has taken advantage of the targeted institution’s inclu-
sion of non-sovereign state entities for membership eligibility in
their constitutions.  In some cases, Taiwan’s full membership in
IGOs may not infer Taiwan’s state sovereignty, but rather, acknowl-
edges its eminent and essential capacity (for instance, as a “fishing
entity,” “health entity,” or “a separate customs territory”) so that
the inclusion of Taiwan would substantially fulfill the IGO’s specific
mission.  Furthermore, some of these listed IGOs are loosely organ-
ized, functionally oriented institutions composed of mid-level gov-
ernmental bureaucracies or research institutes in membership
representation, though membership may distinctively specify na-
tional title.62  Even so, most of these organizations carry insignifi-
61. C. Julia Huang, “Genealogies of NGO-ness: The Cultural Politics of a Global
Buddhist Movement in Contemporary Taiwan,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique,
17(2), 2009, 366.
62. Also see Sigrid Winkler, “Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan’s International
Status,” Taiwan-US Quarterly Analysis, Brookings Institution, no. 7, Nov.  2011. <www
.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/17-taiwan-international-status-winkler>.
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cant political weight in the world of power politics.  As long as the
IGO does not catch much media attention, Taiwan’s applications
for these types of IGOs tend to be less politically sensitive or con-
troversial.  While one would not expect an auspicious elevation of
Taiwan’s international status for its affiliation with such functional-
ity oriented IGOs, they still count toward the numerical growth of
Taiwan’s international participation for public satisfaction.
C. What’s in a Name?  The Semantic Game of Taiwan’s
Nomenclatures
Taiwanese pragmatism is clearly illustrated in its malleable
choices of official titles in IGOs, ranging from the “Republic of
China” (Asian Productivity Organization and Central American In-
tegration System) and “Taiwan” (International Council for Infor-
mation Technology in Government Administration) on the
preferred end of Taiwan’s name choices, to the odious nomencla-
ture of “Taipei, China” (Asian Development Bank) at the other
end of the spectrum.  Situated in the middle of this continuum is a
list of moderately unfavorable, but tolerable, official titles, such as
“Chinese Taipei” or some other neutral and uncontroversial titles.
Depending on the mission, organizational rules, and negotiation re-
sults in each case, Taiwan has bargained hard for a proper nomen-
clature to fit the contextual environment of IGOs and INGOs.  At
its best, Taiwan has tried strenuously to evade the designation of
“Taipei, China” and “Taiwan, China” with a comma between Tai-
wan (or Taipei) and China because these two terms symbolize Tai-
wan’s subordinate status within China’s political domain.  As long
as China is not a member in the targeted organization, Taiwan has a
better chance of utilizing the titles of “ROC” and “Taiwan,” though
it is not guaranteed that the organization will not have second
thoughts the moment China expresses interest in joining the
targeted organization.  Understandably, IGOs tend to adopt a
favorable policy toward China when both Taiwan and China are
members, or when China joins an IGO where Taiwan is already a
member.  One example is the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB)
unilateral change of Taiwan’s nomenclature from “Republic of
China” to “Taipei, China” in 1986, and its disregard of Taiwan’s
strong protest in order to include China within the organization.
The ADB made this decision even though Taiwan had been a
founding member of the ADB in 1966 with an impeccable record of
contributions to the organization.  The game of semantics and punc-
tuation in the tug-of-war regarding Taiwan’s membership designa-
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tion is also exemplified by the case of the Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), which Taiwan joined in 1954.63
Therefore, when unusual circumstance warrants the inevitable,
Taiwan has accepted with extreme reluctance those unfriendly
terms, “Taiwan, China” or “Taipei, China,” under protest, in order
to keep its IGO membership.  In summary, Taiwan’s nomenclatural
adaptation allows it to circumvent the harsh reality of China’s influ-
ential presence in the political calculations of IGOs.
D. Softening the Narrative Appeal
Taiwan’s diplomatic narrative has increasingly geared itself to-
ward a satisfactory goal of “meaningful international participation”
as a way of vindicating Taiwan’s statehood, instead of aiming for
recognition of full sovereign membership.  Without any input in the
establishment of international norms, rules, and standards, it is dif-
ficult for Taiwan as a non-member to learn the concerns, controver-
sies, and complexities of global issues debated and deliberated on in
various IGO sessions and to adopt domestic policies for the imple-
mentation of those decisions to its full capacity.  Being present at
the IGO meeting simply gives Taiwanese participants full knowl-
edge of the issue’s intrigues and nuances, an awareness of the is-
sue’s urgency and policy details, and a sense of fairness and
participation in global governance as a member of the international
community.  This will augment the democratic responsibility of Tai-
wan as a member to fulfill the IGO’s policy in good faith.  In other
words, “process legitimacy” gained through engagement in IGOs
solidifies the member’s “output legitimacy” in policy execution to
minimize domestic resistance.64
However, realizing the intensive pressures of China’s resis-
tance, Taiwan’s narrative shift is directed to downplay the sensitiv-
63. Heh-Song Wang, “Taiwan and the Asian Development Bank,” ABA Journal of
Banking and Finance, 22(2), 2007, <www.aba.org.tw>.  Hui-wan Cho, “China, Taiwan
Co-representation in IGOs,” 102-104,112-114.  Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Taiwan, “‘Shijie dongwu zuzhi’ (OIE) jianjie ji Taiwan yu zhongguo canyu OIE qing-
xing” (World Organization for Animal Health and the Situation of Taiwan’s and
China’s Participation in the OIE), May 25, 2007, <www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/De-
tail/>; World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) website, “OIE International Com-
mittee Succeeds in Bringing China and Taiwan to Fully Participate Together in the
Organization’s Activities,” May 25, 2007, <www.oie.int/en/for-the-media/press-releas
es/>
64. For elaboration, please see Susan Marks, “Democracy and International Gov-
ernance,” in The Legitimacy of International Organizations, ed. By Jean-Marc Coicaud
and Veijo Heiskanen (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2001), 47-68.
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ity of sovereignty in reaching a suboptimal compromise for a win-
win solution among all concerned parties—Taiwan, China, and the
IGO—in membership applications.65  While an IGO membership
with voting rights would be ideal for Taiwan’s endeavors, the
Taiwanese government is fully aware of how challenging a task it is
for an IGO to grant Taiwan’s wish.  Thus, diplomatic flexibility at-
tests to Taiwan’s eagerness to strive for any opportunity to connect
itself to the international society (guoji jiegui) through IGOs as well
as INGOs for information exchange, experience sharing, articula-
tion of the concerns of locality, proposition of fresh thinking,
networking and bonding, image uplifting, and the vitality of civil
society in Taiwan’s democracy.  In return, Taiwan tries to maintain
its political viability on the world political map and transmit a mes-
sage of “forget-me-not” in the global community.  Therefore,
“meaningful international participation” drives Taiwan to stress the
rewards in substance derived from participation rather than the
simple pursuit of name recognition.
Even with Taiwan’s discourse alteration, China’s intent to
squeeze Taiwan’s international space has remained largely un-
changed.  While the situation has been tense, sensationalized media
coverage of the dispute has not helped cross-Strait reconciliation.
For example, SHA Zukang, a high-level Chinese representative in
the UN, has been known as the diehard eliminator of any
Taiwanese attempts for participation in UN-related IGO meetings.
His well-circulated remark of “Who cares about you [Taiwanese]!”,
in the midst of journalist inquires into the world’s slow reaction to
Taiwan’s SARS crisis in 2003, became a classic example of China’s
suppression of Taiwan’s IGO attempts.  His abrupt, arrogant, and
insensitive Chinese attitude toward Taiwan’s public health crisis in-
stantly provoked a public outcry from the Taiwanese.  China’s usual
sense of commanding authority toward subordinating provincial
governments within its own political hierarchy in dealing with Tai-
wan, and its lack of political savvy and understanding of Taiwan’s
democratic dynamics provokes only resentment and disgust.  It only
offered more reasons for the Taiwanese public to support politi-
cians who sought independence or status quo and to doubt the wis-
dom of associating with China in any rational and reasonable logic
in the foreseeable future.
65. Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2009), 222.
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Similar senseless events have occurred in the sphere of INGOs,
despite the fact that INGOs tend to be less politically sensitive and
controversial than IGOs.  Still, China’s long-term educational and
socialization processes have framed Taiwan as a renegade province,
a view which is now deep-rooted in the minds of the Chinese peo-
ple, and the Chinese governmental imposition of harsh restrictions
on the Taiwanese use of names has caused unnecessary friction in
Taiwan’s participation in typically non-political transnational INGO
events.  Even as recently as March 2012, Taiwan’s NGO delegates
with Taiwanese IDs were prohibited from attending the session
hosted by the UN Commission on the Status of Women until these
delegates quickly improvised by showing foreign IDs to join the ses-
sion.66  At the 2010 Tokyo International Film Festival, a Chinese
representative’s request that Taiwan’s delegation only be admitted
under “Taiwan, China” quickly provoked a media sensation and
public debates in Taiwan about China’s nonsensical demand in tran-
sitional non-political events.  Similar kinds of naming controversies
have unfortunately continued in recent years, even over sporting
events, which has hit a nerve and affected cross-Strait relations.67
Over the years, such non-media savvy comments and thought-
less actions has given China an image of being bossy and a bully in
their dealing with Taiwan.  Each unpleasant China-Taiwan encoun-
ter can be instantly uploaded to and infinitely replayed on YouTube
and blogs, not only arousing heated public debates but also provid-
ing the Taiwanese with an opportunity for self-reflection and soul-
searching for the formation of inter-subjective understandings, as
constructive approach scholars like Alexander Wendt have de-
scribed.  One unfortunate incident can immediate negate past
united-front efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to win the
hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people.  Such repeated events
has cultivated, in Taiwan, a collective sense of sorrow, as well as
sensitivity to being helpless amid China’s muscle-flexing threats of
unification.  The fear of losing their democratic way of life under a
potential Chinese non-democratic governance only reinforces the
66. “Tai minjindang : zhonggong daya yi cong guanfang yanshen dao feizhengfu
zuzi” (Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party: China’s suppression has extended from
governmental organizations to NGOs), Radio Free Asia (Chinese), March 28, 2012.
<www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/mjg-03282012095152.html>.
67. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were 85 cases reported
in 2010 for wrongfully listing Taiwan’s NGO as China’s regional member in transna-
tional NGO websites under Chinese NGO’s demand. <www.taiwanngo.tw/files/15-1000-
6330,c88-1.php>.  “Taiwan Wins First Grand Slam Title,” China Post, July 8, 2013.
<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/>.
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Taiwanese determination to keep its liberal political system.  The
effect is a conversion from a China-centered national identity to an
indigenous Taiwanese identity.
It is no wonder that public identification with Taiwan and
“Taiwanese” has increased tremendously in the 1990s and 2000s.
Even under Ma’s regime, the trend of “Taiwanese” identification
has shown no sign of recession.  In other words, China’s contain-
ment policy of squeezing Taiwan’s international space has not ac-
complished what it wished to achieve.  Instead, under China’s
constant pressure, the Taiwanese government has stood unwavering
on the political legitimacy of the ROC in Taiwan with solid public
support from the general public.  However, the Taiwanese public
has displayed a pragmatic posture, as demonstrated in a 2008 sur-
vey in Taiwan, indicating a support of “Chinese Taipei” becoming
Taiwan’s nomenclature for international participation, if the official
membership titles of “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” encounter
strong opposition from China.68
VI. WHY IS IT IN CHINA’S INTEREST TO PROMOTE
TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION?
The aspiration for an associational life in the global community
has led Taiwan to launch the so-called “huolu waijiao,” or “flexible
diplomacy.”  So far, cross-Strait relations since Ma’s inauguration in
2008 have not generated noticeable expansion of Taiwan’s interna-
tional space.  During the period of 2008 to mid-2013, Taiwan had
become either a full member or an observer in six international or-
ganizations.69 Among these six IGOs, the name “Chinese Taipei”
was adopted to represent Taiwan as a full member in the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in 2010, the Stan-
dards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) in 2010, and South
Pacific Regional Fishery Management Organization (SPRFMO) in
2012.  The same title was used for Taiwan as an observer in the
68. T.Y. Wang, Wei-chin Lee, and Ching-hsin Yu, “Taiwan’s Expansion of Interna-
tional Space: Opportunities and Challenges,” Journal of Contemporary China, 20(69),
2011, 263.
69. According to Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Taiwan joined 6 additional
international organizations by October 2011, though the website of Taiwan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in 2012 shows only five after 2008. See Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, <www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Home/RelatedLink/?opno=be23c3a0-2e22-4fe3-b3
7c-3599074880f4> and Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Taiwan’s 2012 Presiden-
tial Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Implications for the United States (Washington,
DC; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), A Report of the CSIS Free-
man Chair in China Studies, November 2011, 3.
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WTO’s World Health Assembly (WHA) in 2009 and the Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2011.70  The only
IGO that Taiwan joined during this timeframe under the name of
“Taiwan” was the International Council for Information Technol-
ogy in Government Administration (ICA), an IGO with a mission
to address policies concerning the public sector’s computer-based
information system.  Undoubtedly, with its immense web of moni-
toring and tight control of its internet traffic and limited trans-
parency in domestic governance, China is unlikely to join this
organization to avoid sharing details regarding its IT system policies
with other member states.
Naturally, it is hard for Taiwan to expand its international
space by leaps and bounds.  China will definitely continue its own
self-defined “one China” principle, unless various constituencies of
the Chinese government, including the powerful People’s Libera-
tion Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – two primary de-
fenders and executors of the one China principle – realize that the
long-term benefits of promoting Taiwanese international participa-
tion outweighs the cost of not doing so. Under the circumstances,
why is it in China’s interest to promote and broaden Taiwan’s space
of international participation?
A. China’s Sovereignty Assertion and Taiwan’s Identity Shift
Following Taiwan’s active and systematic identity reconstruc-
tion movements started by two former presidents, LEE Teng-hui
and CHEN Shui-bian, Taiwan’s indigenous identity has garnered
significant support from the Taiwanese people, as tracked systemat-
ically by the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi Uni-
versity from 1992 to 2012.  The percentage of people who identified
themselves as solely “Chinese” was 25.5% in 1992, and steadily de-
clined to a mere 4% in 2008, and to 3.1% in 2012.  In contrast, the
increasing trend of  “Taiwanese” identification rose from 17.6% in
1992 to 48.4% in 2008, and again to 53.7% in 2012.  If one adds the
percentage of respondents with dual identities, “both Chinese and
Taiwanese,” either 43.1% in 2008 or 39.9% in 2012, to the percent-
70. Here, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization can be a
good model to illuminate Taiwan’s international participation in IGOs.  According to
Art. 1, paragraph 2 (b), the SPRFMO permits “any entity” involved in the regional
organization’s operational mission to join as a contracting party by citing Art. 305, para-
graph 1 (c), (d), and (e) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention as a guideline for
accepting “non-state” fishing entities.  In this case, the Law of the Sea opens up a gate
of entry for Taiwan to join IGOs related to management of maritime resources.
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age of Taiwanese identifiers, it is safe to conclude that more than
90% of respondents have identified themselves more or less as
Taiwanese.  On the other hand, respondents who solely identify
themselves as Chinese have dwindled to single-digits in ratio con-
sistently since 2002.71  The divergent paths of political development
and mutual distrust have led to a significant perception gap be-
tween what most Taiwanese perceive to be the confines of “China”
and the identity of “Chinese” and the Chinese government’s naı¨ve
presumption of Taiwan’s willingness to be part of the PRC’s China
and be identified as “Chinese” within the PRC political domain.
The PRC’s wishful thinking has not found a huge audience in Tai-
wan, where most people, if prompted to make a choice, regard
“China” as a reference to the ROC (Republic of China).  Even
some Taiwanese pro-independence elites, who in the past have
scorned any slight reference to “China” in Taiwan’s political market
as anathema to their noble cause for Taiwan’s independence, now
say that they are willing to deal with “China,” as long as “China”
refers specifically to the “ROC” in Taiwan.  Apparently, an emerg-
ing consensus in Taiwan is that the “Republic of China” has gained
increasing support from both the KMT and the DPP, as seen by
recent and more vivid showings of the ROC flag in various public
gatherings by political groups with different ideological
dispositions.
Taiwan’s unwillingness to be affiliated with PRC governance
has made maintaining the cross-Strait status quo the preference for
the majority of Taiwanese citizens, told by various surveys con-
ducted since 2000.  The supporters of both “unification as soon as
possible” and “maintain status quo, but move toward unification”
with China combined to register a minority opinion of lower than
10% in 2012.72  The survey results imply that the identity shift over
time and the separate track of social development have shattered
71. “Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys
by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2012.06),” Election Study Center, National
Chengchi University, <esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChinese
ID.htm>. Similar situation occurred in in German public opinion pools concerning what
“Germany” is in the 1970s and 1980s.  See Gebhard Schweigler, “German Questions or
the Shrinking of Germany,” The Two-German States and European Security, ed. by F.
Stephen Larrabee (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 102.
72. “Changes in the Unification-Independence Stance of Taiwanese as Tracked in
Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1994-2012.06),” Election Study Center,
National Chengchi University, <esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/tondu
ID.htm>.  A similar trend is also confirmed by the 2011 Taiwan National Security Sur-
vey, Duke University, February 24-27, 2011.  See the result in Table C10.
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essential components of “Chinese” nationalism that held sway in
the past.  As Benedict Anderson described, nationalism has been a
key source in sensitizing different narrative discourses to mold
imagined political communities.  Nevertheless, the changing nexus
of time-space can result in people of the same ethnic and cultural
origin drifting into heterogeneous identities from an otherwise com-
monly shared nationalism.73  Regrettably, the Chinese government
has neither understood nor sympathized with the emergence of Tai-
wan’s indigenous identity since the late 1980s.
In a nutshell, if unification remains a core interest for China,
this should be a serious concern.  The widening identity gap can be
partially attributed to the persistent efforts of former Taiwanese
leaders to lessen Chinese essence in social constructs and to care-
fully craft and effectuate a separate national identity.  Nevertheless,
Beijing should also take part of the blame for emphatically prohib-
iting Taiwan from co-sharing the domain of China in international
society.  Hence, one should not be surprised to learn that more than
70% of the respondents of the 2011 Taiwan National Security Sur-
vey considered Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, officially
called “the Republic of China,” without any necessity of declaring
independence.74
The loss of the political representation of “China” in the inter-
national arena further precipitated Taiwan’s questioning of the pur-
pose and utility of its socio-political linkages to China.  This not
only alienated the Taiwanese public from having any significant
identity linkage with China, but also prompted Taiwan to seek a
proper nomenclature to illustrate its own identity.  China’s domi-
neering style and “bossy” attitude towards Taiwan, treating Tawain
as an inferior, regional counterpart, like Hong Kong, in its asym-
metrical positioning toward China, has precipitated the trend of
Taiwanese alienation and drifting away from the PRC’s self-defined
version of “China” and “Chinese.”  Instead, it has proven what for-
mer Taiwanese governments have long preached: China’s intent to
surround, shrink, and suffocate Taiwan’s international space in or-
der to bring Taiwan to its knees using diplomatic pressure.  As a
defensive mechanism, the Taiwanese public as well as socio-political
73. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Citizens of the Earth,” in Varieties of Sovereignty and
Citizenship, ed. Sigal R. Ben-Porath and Rogers M. Smith (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 219-221.
74. The 2011 Taiwan National Security Survey, Duke University, February 24-27,
2011. See the result in Table C34.
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elites naturally adopted a trenching mentality in resisting China’s
diplomatic pressures.
B. Identity as a Salient Issue in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and
Foreign Policy
Taiwan’s drift from a China-centered identity has impacted do-
mestic political development.  Like other democratic societies, Tai-
wan’s policy agenda setting, design, and implementation are usually
the result of a strategic game of “pulling and hauling” among multi-
ple domestic actors, including political parties, social groups, and
bureaucratic institutions.  Since electoral victory is the prerequisite
for governance in democracy, most actors will need to detect public
sentiment and best reflect what the public wants in order to win an
electoral mandate for political authority.  In Taiwan’s case, the
presidential elections in both 2008 and 2012 were clear endorse-
ments of Ma’s cross-Strait proposals.  Ma’s moves for peaceful rec-
onciliation since 2008 and his explicit declaration of “one ‘Republic
of China,’ two areas” in his 2012 inaugural speech have been impor-
tant signals in Taiwanese politics, which have been tormented by a
divided sense of national identity for decades.  Ma’s announce-
ments also fall within the spirit of the 1992 Consensus as a baseline
for reconciliation.
Regardless, to expect Ma to have a giant leap forward beyond
what he has proclaimed would be unrealistic in light of Taiwan’s
identity division and competitive party politics.  His positive out-
reach still depends on China’s favorable return to make gradual
progress.  Taiwan’s requests for international participation require
both sides to work in a somewhat synchronized manner.  China
could reciprocate by consolidating Ma’s proclamations by accom-
modating Taiwan’s international space expansion.  This would help
Ma’s policy effectiveness, tone down Taiwanese criticism of China’s
suppression of Taiwan’s international participation, and abate the
Taiwanese public’s suspicion of China’s cross-Strait overtures.
Here, the claim that international institutions are primarily a
reflection of the balance of national power underestimates both the
intricacies of strategic interactions among domestic actors with di-
verse preferences, and the uncertainties embedded in the aggregat-
ing mechanism of domestic politics in a democratic society.75  While
75. For discussion of the interaction between domestic politics and international
politics, please see John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institu-
tions,” International Security, 19(3), 1994/95, 7; Helen V. Milner, “Rationalizing Politics:
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\14-1\AOP101.txt unknown Seq: 41 19-MAR-14 15:07
THE MUTUAL NON-DENIAL PRINCIPLE 41
China has stressed government-to-government interactions with
Ma’s administration in dealing with the issue of international insti-
tutions, China’s imposition of its self-defined “one China” policy,
uncompromising attitude, and “bullying” style of diplomacy have
created concerns about Taiwan’s future association with China
amongst the Taiwanese public.  This has offered a political agenda
for Taiwanese parties to mobilize and gain electoral advantages.
Identity division between political parties has made any cross-Strait
policy deliberation loaded with anxiety, distrust, and suspicion of
selling Taiwan to China’s exploration and penetration.  A signifi-
cant proportion of “Sino-skeptic” Taiwanese, along with the opposi-
tion parties, believe that the island nation would be at risk if it
deepens its ties with the “big and bossy” China. Any simple cross-
Strait interaction is intensely examined by media and political par-
ties, and offers ample reasons for Sino-skeptics to jeer, not cheer, as
much as possible.  Any of Ma’s moderate pragmatic initiatives con-
cerning China have to combat opponents’ “pull up the drawbridge”
approach to cross-Strait relations, as evidenced in the approval pro-
cess of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
for the reduction of trade barriers in 2010, and the Agreement on
Trade in Services in 2013 for mutual market access and
transparency.
Moreover, this is not merely a domestic political issue, but also
a concern for Taiwan’s allies because Ma’s 2008 initiative of cross-
Strait rapprochement could redraw Taiwan’s relations with its allies,
particularly the US and Japan, in equal measure.  The East Asian
strategic landscape and regional security would look very different
shorn of its useful counterweight to the rapid expansion of China’s
powerful ascendency.  Even so, both the US and Japan also encoun-
tered similar tasks of reevaluating their approach to China in light
of China’s inevitable and immeasurable presence.
China’s failure to realize the collateral impacts of its rigid “one
China” principle on Taiwan’s pluralistic society surely explains why
it has had a tough time converting unfavorable public sentiment
within Taiwan toward China’s policy.  After all, Ma’s policy of “dig-
nity, autonomy, pragmatism, and flexibility” in managing Taiwan’s
foreign affairs and cross-Strait relations is derived from the conver-
gence of domestic preferences and pressures.  Thus, China’s current
priority should focus on the cultivation of a friendly political atmos-
The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics,” Inter-
national Organization, 52(4), Autumn 1998, 767-779.
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phere toward Taiwan in order to win over Taiwanese hearts and
minds in a bottom-up approach to influence Taiwanese government
policy.
Hence, in an asymmetric balance of tangible power across the
Taiwan Strait, a feasible deal would require the stronger party (i.e.,
China) to give extra latitude for a better offering to convince the
weaker party (i.e., Taiwan) to reach a solid institutional commit-
ment.  This is because the stronger party has abundant resources to
spare, and the weaker party often harbors anxiety and fear of future
uncertainties in any institutional deal.  Particularly, when the power
gap between them widens, the weaker party will request further
concessions from the stronger in order to place additional con-
straints upon the stronger party.  On the other hand, the more the
stronger party can credibly restrain itself and make “above and be-
yond” concessions, the more likely the weaker party will be inclined
to seriously consider an institutional bargain with its stronger coun-
terpart.76  This line of thinking echoes what Mensius stated before:
“The superior will treat the inferior with compassion; the inferior
will deal with the superior with wisdom.” (Dashiiao yiren;
xiaoshida, yizhi).77  In the case of cross-Strait relations, the situa-
tion is even more complicated in that Taiwan has US support to
mitigate China’s compelling threats.  China’s suppression of Tai-
wan’s international space only increases the Taiwanese people’s and
Chinese leaders’ fear that China will exploit them further in the
future and drive Taiwan closer to the US.78  Therefore, China’s gen-
erous concessions signal a strong commitment to be self-con-
strained by an institutional deal, which attempts to trade short-term
benefits for long-term gains.
China actually can receive multiple benefits by promoting Tai-
wan’s international participation in IGOs.  First, it could defuse
rhetorical power and sentiment of anti-Chinese opponents within
Taiwan.  Second, China could also create a boomerang effect to
gradually tone down the feverish sentiment of nationalism within
China for a reasonable and rational approach to cross-Strait rela-
76. Please see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategies, Strategic Re-
straint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2000, 4-5; G. John Ikenberry, “State Power and the Institutional Bargain,”
50-54.  )
77. See Mensius, Lianghuiwang pian (the volume of King Lianghui).  President Ma
frequently cited this statement to support his rapprochement policy toward China.
78. Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,”
International Organization, 64(4), fall 2010, 627-660.
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tions.  Third, it would improve China’s global image as a benevolent
power, responsible stakeholder, and pragmatic actor in regional and
international affairs.  Overall, this would aid China’s aspiration for
a “peaceful rise” in the world arena.  As mentioned earlier in refer-
ence to Habermas’s insights, any utterance of norms and principles
in communicative action represents both the factual presentation of
the reality and legitimizes the interpersonal relations as well as the
particular vision and wish of the initiator (Taiwan) and respondent
(China).79  These multiple benefits of China’s concession effort
could be examined in two interrelated issues: one dealing with Tai-
wan’s nomenclatures, and the other addressing Taiwan’s member-
ship status.
C. The Utility of Naming for Social Reconstruction
Several suggestions are worth considering.  First, China should
not impose its ideal nomenclature of Taiwan, such as “Taipei,
China” or “Taiwan, China.”  Both names carry a negative implica-
tion and have been adamantly rejected by Taiwan.80  Hence, “Chi-
nese Taipei” seems to be an unobjectionable choice for both sides
because it meets both Taiwan’s wish for political distinction and
China’s interest in keeping “China” as part of Taiwan’s nomencla-
ture.  Frankly, the term “Chinese Taipei” has become a nominal
substitute for Taiwan’s representation in international participation
since its inception for Taiwan’s participation in the Olympic Games
in the early 1980s, though both sides might not rank this nomencla-
ture high on their preference lists.  China’s claim in its 2000 White
Paper that “Chinese Taipei” is “only an ad hoc arrangement and
cannot constitute a model applicable to other inter-governmental
organizations or international gatherings” has, in reality, actually
been modified.
Second, China should not object to a nomenclature falling
within the IGO premises of membership, such as Taiwan’s name as
79. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 67.
80. Semantic differences of nomenclatures signify various identity perspectives and
political implications.  “Chinese Taipei” will be a better choice because the word “Chi-
nese” carries a broader implication beyond politics, should Taiwan’s official title, “Re-
public of China,” be unattainable.  Still, the translation of “Chinese Taipei” in Chinese
should be “Zhonghua Taipei,” not “Zhongguo Taipei,” because the Chinese translation
of “Zhongguo Taipei” still implies China’s authority over Taiwan.  See David W. F.
Huang, “Shitan liangan hejiexia Taiwan canyu guoji zuzhi zhi fali jichu” (Exploring the
Legal Bases of Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations in the Contest of
2008 Cross-Strait Rapprochement), Taiwan guojifa jikan (Taiwan International Law
Quarterly), 5(4), 2008, 81-83.
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a separate customs territorial entity in the WTO, as long as the spe-
cific IGO accepts non-sovereign state entities for membership.
Since Taiwan remains out of China’s administrative control, China’s
acceptance of Taiwan’s IGO membership with limited rights is
merely to meet the Taiwanese people’s welfare, domestic satisfac-
tion, and management of the global commons.  Such a “non-sover-
eign state” membership status is rarely treated as recognition of
statehood by the international community.  In reality, it is simply a
pragmatic expression of Ma’s assertion of “mutual non-denial of
governing authority” to ensure the inclusion of Taiwan in a seam-
less coverage of global resource management.81  Until now, both
sides should have developed a list of mutually non-objectionable
nomenclatures based on past practices for Taiwan’s international
participation.
Third, China’s conciliatory move in naming within the broad
confines of “one China” would carry beneficial socializing effects
by injecting some elements of “Chineseness” into media, political
discussion, and daily references to Taiwan at the onset and hope-
fully influence and reorient various political actors’ subjective and
inter-subjective preferences in the construction of their individual
interests.82  This would socialize each side’s domestic constituencies
as well as international audiences for gradual convergence and inte-
gration of mindsets.  Unnecessary disputes and disruption on the
nomenclature issue would only add fuel to the fire of Taiwan’s do-
mestic politics, and simultaneously toughen the uncompromising
stance of Chinese nationalists.  On this point, China’s willingness to
make concessions represents a blend of realistic calculations to en-
tice Taiwan into a joint liberalist conviction in an institutional
framework based on the 1992 Consensus, and to rope Taiwan into
the identity confines of a broader meaning of “China.”  The prac-
tice of “mutual non-denial” of governance authority in each side’s
territorial control in international participation would reinforce the
“one China” principle.
With China’s increasing influence and power in world politics,
China effectively holds a quasi-veto power over any of Taiwan’s at-
tempts for sovereign recognition in IGOs.  As long as the represen-
tative title of Taiwan does not seriously deviate from the essence of
81. As for the analysis of “mutual non-denial of governing authority,” please see
Chun-I Chen, “Legal Aspects of Mutual Non-Denial, 111-127.
82. Colin Hay, “Ideas and the Construction of Interests,” in Ideas and Politics in
Social Science Research, ed. Daniel Be´land and Robert Henry Cox (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 65-82.
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the 1992 Consensus, China should take this golden opportunity to
employ Taiwan’s IGO and INGO participation to conceptualize,
contextualize, and construct a broadly and loosely defined “one
China” concept.
D. Bring It In: Taiwan’s Membership Status
As for Taiwan’s application for IGO membership, China has
frequently cited the difficulty of changing the strict membership re-
quirements stipulated by the constitutional conventions of the IGO,
which tends to accept only state members.  However, as past exam-
ples of the UN’s acceptance of new members have shown, political
discretion toward geopolitical concerns, ideological considerations,
and political reality have undoubtedly played a large role in mem-
bership approval.  There are cases in which countries have been
granted IGO membership even prior to their UN membership, as
testified by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations) memberships of Burma/Myanmar (FAO member-
ship in 1947, UN membership granted in 1948) and Indonesia (FAO
membership in 1948, UN membership established in 1950).
Namibia even acquired IGO memberships in 1977 through a UN
General Assembly Resolution long before its eventual indepen-
dence in March 1990.  As Rosalyn Higgins, the former President of
the International Court of Justice, 2006-2009, judiciously indicated,
the admission to the UN specialized agencies has shown a sense of
pragmatism in their experiences in granting new membership.
Some constitutions of the UN specialized agencies have not used
the term “state” as a requirement of membership, and non-UN
membership has not been an adamant prior condition which pre-
vented legitimate political entities from being admitted to
UNESCO, ICAO, the WHO, the UPU, and the ILO.  Higgins even
pointed out that political entities with controversial international
status and an inability to secure “state” membership for the UN can
bring a dispute to the attention of the General Assembly or be in-
vited to appear before the Security Council, without a vote, to par-
ticipate in the discussion for the purpose of peaceful settlement of
disputes under Article 32 and Article 35(2) of the UN Charter.  In a
similar design, Art. 93 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) also encourages non-UN members to join the ICJ to
employ the judicial mechanism for conflict resolution.83
83. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 41-42.
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Consequently, after examining multiple practices of IGO mem-
berships in the past, Robert H. Jackson declared that political expe-
diency has striven to include various quasi-states similar to Taiwan
in international institutions with the idea that “. . .international law
adapting to the new, inclusive, pluralistic, egalitarian, and far flung
community of states, by a definite and indeed pronounced loosen-
ing of empirical qualifications on sovereign statehood.”84  Political
entities without UN membership could be invited and granted ob-
server status, or even full membership in accordance with the spe-
cific IGO’s constitutional provisions and political contexts.  It is
self-evident that the admission of members can be permitted by
reasons other than strict constitutional provisions in the
convention.85
That being said, it does not mean Taiwan’s increased interna-
tional participation would be easy.  For example, despite its status
as a non-ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) mem-
ber, Taiwan’s Taoyuan international airport was ranked 16th in the
world in terms of the number of international passengers embarked
and disembarked in 2012.86  In June 2013, the US House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate consecutively passed bills to endorse Tai-
wan’s bid for observership in the triennial ICAO’s Assembly
meeting scheduled to take place in September 2013 in Montreal,
Canada.  After the US granted Taiwan visa waiver status in 2012,
proponents of the bill claimed that Taiwan’s participation in the
ICAO increases the safety and security of travel across the Pacific.87
And finally, on September 14, 2013, ten days before the ICAO As-
sembly meeting, the ICAO Council President invited Taiwan’s Civil
Aeronautics Administration Director-General to attend the ICAO
Assembly meeting as a “guest,” rather than “observer,” due to the
lack of consensus among ICAO members regarding Taiwan’s inter-
national status.
84. Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-Sates, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: In-
ternational Jurisprudence and the third World,” International Organization, 41(4), 1987,
531.
85. White, The Law of International Organizations, 58-62.
86. Taiwan’s Taoyuan International Airport was ranked 19th airport in terms of the
number of passengers in 2011.  See International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Annual Report of the Council, 2011, Documentation for the Session of the Assembly in
2013, Doc 9975, published in 2012, 10.  As for the 2012 data, please see Airports Coun-
cil International’s Monthly Traffic Statistics Collection. <www.aci.aero/Data-Centre/
Monthly-Traffic-Data/International-Passenger-Rankings/12-months>.
87. “US Senators Hail Passage of Bill Supporting Taiwan’s ICAO Bid,” Focus Tai-
wan (news channel), June 22, 2013, <focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201306220023.aspx>.
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Taiwan has been absent in the deliberation and decision-mak-
ing of ICAO rules since Taiwan lost its UN seat in 1971, though
Taiwan is in charge of the Taipei Flight Information Region, a cru-
cial air traffic area in northeast Asia.  Without the membership
privilege of learning the details of ICAO’s standards and code, Tai-
wan has had to rely on the goodwill of friendly allies to deliver and
share technical and safety information in a delayed fashion, includ-
ing the ICAO’s mandatory Universal Security Audit Program
launched in November 2002.88  Most of the time, Taiwan’s air traffic
system compatibility has had to rely on the US for audits to ensure
its compliance with the ICAO Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices (SARPs).  Not being a member of the ICAO has also delayed
the timely and effective implementation of international compatible
rules and regulations in Taiwan’s international aviation traffic to
more than 100 international destinations as well as more than 600
plus cross-Strait weekly flights in 2013.  In the past, miscommunica-
tions have occurred when Taiwan’s aviation control has failed to
keep abreast of rapidly changing technology and route procedures
affecting the Taipei Flight Identification Region (TFIR) approved
by the ICAO.89  When Obama signed H.R. 1151 into law, support-
ing Taiwan’s request for ICAO observer status in July 2013, China’s
official response was that foreign interference in Taiwan’s IGO par-
ticipation merely complicated the issue.  China claimed that Tai-
wan’s participation was more of an “internal matter” and that
consultation should take place between the two sides without third
party intervention.90  In fact, China’s snail-pace response to Tai-
wan’s IGO requests made since Ma’s 2008 inauguration was in-
tended to increase pressure on Ma to actively engage in serious
political dialogues with China regarding Taiwan’s sovereign state-
hood and its subordinate position within China’s interpretation of
the “one China” principle.
88. Chi-kuo Mao, “Allow ROC’s Place in ICAO,” The Korean Times, Sept. 20,
2010. <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/09/167_73382.html>; Halina M.
Biernacki, The ICAO Aviation Security Program, <www.icao.int/Meetings/FAL12/Doc-
uments/Biernacki.pdf>. For a brief understanding of ICAO, please see Louis Henkin,
Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and
Materials (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1993), 3rd edition, 1476-78.
89. “Ma ganxie mei zhichi” (Ma Appreciated US Support), United Daily, July 14,
2013, p. A2; David Brown, “Time Taiwan Joined Global Air–Safety Body,” Asia Times,
May 22, 2013. <www.atimes.com>.
90. China’s complaints were based on the author’s interview with Chinese scholars
on cross-Strait relations in Shanghai, July 21-25, 2013.
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Candidly speaking, Taiwan’s admission to the ICAO would
also ensure better business practices in air traffic safety regulations
and standards compatible with the ICAO’s guidelines.  After all,
the ICAO is a technical organization with “many good reasons to
bring everyone in,” as David MacKenzie has concluded, rather than
keep any state or political entity out.91  Surely, as required, Tai-
wan’s membership application for the ICAO will need a four-fifths
vote of the 191 member states in the Assembly (as of 2011).92  As
one of the Security Council’s permanent members with veto power,
China’s decision will greatly influence Taiwan’s application for ob-
server status in the ICAO.  Despite the requirement of a four-fifths
majority, China’s implicit or explicit stand of non-opposition to Tai-
wan’s observer status would definitely facilitate Taiwan’s member-
ship application.  In other words, if China’s opposition is the
paramount barrier to Taiwan’s membership application, then the
easy way to cut the Gordian Knot is China’s explicit non-opposition
to Taiwan’s application.  If full membership is unlikely due to
China’s strong objection, Taiwan must pursue observership status
without voting rights.  If granted, China would virtually hold the
veto power to check any of Taiwan’s future moves to gain full sov-
ereign state membership.  In this way, Taiwan could fulfill its goal
of meaningful participation while China retains its control of Tai-
wan’s membership status.  Interestingly, the eligibility of ICAO
membership does not require the applicant to first be a UN mem-
ber in order to be eligible for ICAO membership, as exemplified in
the case of Switzerland, who became a member of the ICAO long
before joining the UN.93
If China becomes concerned about Taiwan’s maneuvering to
gain full state membership through observership, China could re-
quest that the Assembly prescribe conditions to protect China’s vi-
tal interests as quid pro quo of the approval of Taiwan’s observer
91. David Mackenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 217.
92. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, “Taiwan’s quest for meaningful participa-
tion in the International Civil Aviation Organization,” April 2011, <www.mofa.gov.tw/
Organizations/TwoColumnList/TwoColumnListNews/?opno=63b9b1ed-faed-4830-91b7-
cc6797ee34d9>; “Taiwan Seeks to Join ICAO Technical Meetings,” September 27, 2010.
<www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/09/27/274076/Taiwan-seeks
.htm>.
93. Mackenzie, ICAO: A History, 218.
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status.94  Here the idea of China’s prescription of conditions of Tai-
wan’s application comes from Article 93 of the ICAO Convention,
which stipulates that those enemy states of World War II seeking
admission to the ICAO can be subject to “conditions as the Assem-
bly may prescribe.”  In other words, the past practices of Article 93
could be a precedent for China’s handling of Taiwan’s application.
Even Article 92(a) of the 1944 ICAO Convention states, “this Con-
vention shall be open for adherence by members of the United Na-
tions and States associated with them, and States which remained
neutral during the present world conflict” – this can become a crea-
tive way to admit Taiwan.  Although the second part of Article
92(a) on states with neutrality refers to those parties adhering to
the Declaration of United Nations in 1942, it should not be an in-
surmountable barrier for ICAO members to offer an innovative in-
terpretation of limited membership to Taiwan, with China’s
consent.95  In reality, the ICAO admitted some former enemy
states, such as Romania in 1965, Bulgaria in 1967, and Hungary in
1969, without subjecting them to a four-fifths majority vote as re-
quired by the ICAO convention.96  The message is clear: if there is a
will, there is always a way to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s expansion
of space for international participation.
In fact, in the ICJ’s advisory opinion of the First Admissions
Case in 1948, upon a request made by the UN General Assembly in
1947, regarding applications for UN memberships by several states,
the court concluded that member states do not need to explain the
grounds of their voting decisions.97  In other words, in the world of
political reality, there is no obligation for China to elaborate upon
its reasons to support Taiwan’s application for IGO membership as
long as Taiwan acts within the realm of the “one China” frame-
94. Mackenzie, ICAO: A History, 75. The Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion Organization is available in <www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx>; Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation Organization, 9th edition, 2006, Doc 7300/9.
95. White, The Law of International Organizations, 60.
96. Niels M. Blokker, Henry G. Schermers, International Institutional Law (Leiden:
Brill, 2011), 5th ed., 82-83.
97. “As a Member who votes is entitled to do so without giving any reasons for his
vote, he may act in accordance with his own view of the case.” International Court of
Justice, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article
4 of the Charter), May 28, 1948, General List No. 3, 1948 I.C.J. 57, p. 36.  <www.ilsa.org/
jessup/jessup07/basicmats/icj_advisory_opinion.pdf>.  For further elaboration, see C. F.
Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 105-110.
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work.  China’s non-obstructionist act of goodwill would facilitate
Taiwan’s participation in international affairs.
In essence, observer status or other non-full membership with-
out voting rights does not constitute an automatic entitlement to
the rights of full membership, which usually requires additional ac-
tion to cross the IGO threshold.  Nevertheless, the common idea of
universal representation in IGOs refers to not only “universal rep-
resentation of states,” but also “universal representation of territo-
ries,” which are not under any state member’s effective
governance.98  In accordance with its Standing Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly of the ICAO, non-contracting states and interna-
tional organizations duly invited by the Council or the Assembly
may participate in Assembly sessions as observers without voting
rights.99  Hence, the claim that the ICAO’s decision to invite Tai-
wan to participate in the 2013 ICAO Assembly meeting as the
ICAO Council President’s “guest,” rather than an “observer,” with
China’s immediate comment of its show of “good will” toward Tai-
wan indicated China’s significant weight behind the scenes.100  In
fact, over 40 observers representing international organizations,
non-full sovereign entities, and enterprises in the aviation industry
have been invited to attend the ICAO meetings as observers in the
past.101  For example, after the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) became an ICAO’s non-voting observer in 1974, its attempt
to gain full membership was still blocked in 1989 by the US.102  US
98. Michael Sheng-ti Gau, “Guoji minhang zuzhi guanchayuan zhidu ji lingyu
daibiao pubianhua zhi gainian” (ICAO System of Observership and the Concept of
Universalization of Territorial Representation), Soochow Law Journal, 11(1), 1998, 73-
112.
99. Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the ICAO, Doc 7600/7, 7th ed.,
2012, Adopted by the Assembly in 1952 (Resolution A6-12; Doc 7670).  Articles con-
cerning observer can be seen in 5, 25, 26, and 43. <www.icao.int/publications/Docu
ments/7600_7ed.pdf>.  The ICAO’s Rule of Procedure for the Council also contains pro-
visions regarding observers.  See Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO
(Portland, Oregon: Eleven International Publishing, 2008), 145.
100. Lawrence Chiu and Y.F. Low, “China Says Taiwan’s ICAO Invitation a Show of
China’s Good Will,” Focus Taiwan, News Channel, Sept. 13, 2013, <focustaiwan.tw/
news/acs/201309130016.aspx>
101. “In Support of Taiwan’s Observership and Meaningful Participation in the
ICAO,” April 18, 2013. <www.thevoiceslu.com/features/2013/april/18_04_13/In_Support
.htm>.
102. The ICAO voted to allow the PLO to become a non-voting observer in 1974 to
attend the regional meeting but only as a member of the delegation from the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, African Union, or the Arab League.  In 1977, the ICAO voted
again to permit the PLO to attend ICAO meetings with 70 countries in favor, 33 coun-
tries in abstention, and three countries  (the US, Israel, and South Africa) in opposition.
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conditions restraining the PLO’s ICAO membership status could be
a model for China to emulate.
With a prior arrangement of conditions for Taiwan’s member-
ship, China could impose conditions to bind Taiwan within the spe-
cific IGO.  Meanwhile, China could also lay out thresholds to bail
Taiwan out of the IGO.  Although there are variations in constitu-
tional provisions of membership in other functional IGOs with
technical aspects, such as the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Meteorological
Organization, Taiwan’s admission to the ICAO with proper mem-
bership status, rather than an ad hoc “guest” in the case of 2013
ICAO Assembly meeting, would pave the way for other organiza-
tions to explore.  In this case, Taiwan may be able to request admis-
sion to the annual Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC in
accordance with Art 7(6) of the Convention, as long as no more
than one third of the Parties present object to a nomenclature ac-
cepted by both Taiwan and China.103  As of 2013, Palestine, the Vat-
ican, and South Sudan are observers of the UNFCCC.  The
acceptance of Taiwan to the UNFCCC conference would make the
global network of climate change missions more complete.  The
same applies to the mission of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, an IGO of 185 state members and six territories including
“Hong Kong, China” and “Macao, China.”  Taiwan lost its WMO
membership in 1972 after China’s entrance to the UN.
Therefore, should a single IGO, China, and Taiwan achieve an
acceptable compromise, the chapter on Taiwan’s repeated moves to
“PLO Gets Observer Status in the ICAO,” The Global Jewish News Source, Oct. 5,
1977.  <www.jta.org/1977/10/05/archive/plo-gets-observer-status-in-the-icao>.  This is
not to say that the US is capable of preventing PLO from changing its status from
observer to full membership.  A good example is the PLO’s bid for full membership in
the UNESCO on Oct. 31, 2011 with several political ramifications to the US and Israel.
See Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU), “Fact Sheet on the PLO’s Bid for
UNESCO membership,” Oct. 31, 2011. <imeu.net/news/article0021674.shtml>. BBC
New, Middle East, “Palestinians’ Upgraded UN Status,” November 30, 2012.
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13701636>.
103. Art. 7(6), UNFCCC, stipulates that “The United Nations, its specialized agen-
cies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof
or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the
Conference of the Parties as observers. Anybody or agency, whether national or inter-
national, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by
the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at
a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at
least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observ-
ers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.”
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employ international participation as a publicity stunt for the cause
of achieving sovereignty for Taiwan will close.  Cross-Strait rela-
tions will then shift increasingly toward bilateral interactions with-
out much disruption from the international community.  Also, by
accepting such a politically arranged deal of non-sovereign mem-
bership for Taiwan in IGOs, China benefits from Taiwan’s consis-
tent commitment to utilize the nomenclature of “Chinese Taipei”
when joining IGOs.  The recurrent confirmation of “Chinese
Taipei” within the “one China” principle in various IGOs eventu-
ally creates a “legitimate clarifying process,” in Thomas M. Franck’s
extrapolation, to fixate Taiwan’s identity in agreements and mutual
understandings for a “compliance pull” in international society and
cross-Strait interactions.104
All these scenarios rely on the acknowledgement of the mutual
non-denial principle in governance authority to assist the legitimiz-
ing and clarifying process of the “one China” principle.  When
China chooses to embrace the mutual non-denial principle in spirit
and action to promote Taiwan’s international participation within
the PRC’s conditions, Taiwan’s demands for full sovereignty in
IGO representation will lose steam.  As Huang cautiously noted,
the legal implication of the continuous adoption of the title “Chi-
nese Taipei” can inadvertently and gradually undermine the sover-
eignty and status implied by the use of the name “Republic of
China” in international society.105  Meanwhile, China is still
haunted by the “shadow of the past” — Taiwan’s aggressive asser-
tion for its independence by former presidents and the Democratic
Progressive Party — and the shadow of the future — the anxieties
over Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy shift due to regime change from a
China-friendly governing party (KMT) to a China-hostile govern-
ment by the DPP.106  The interplay of dual shadows has made
China cautious towards making any bold and creative moves.  Un-
fortunately, the consequence has been an extremely conservative
approach to Taiwan’s requests for the expansion of its international
space.
104. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy, 73, 80-88, 234.
105. Wei-feng Huang, “Shitan liangan hejiexia Taiwan canyu guoji zuzhi zhi fali
jichu” (Exploring the Legal Bases of Taiwan’s Participation in International Organiza-
tion in the Context of 2008 Cross-Strait Rapprochement), Taiwan guojifa jikan (Taiwan
International Law Quarterly), 5(4), December 2008, 63-94.
106. Based on the author’s interview with Chinese scholars on cross-Strait relations,
July 21-25, 2013, China’s concerns are shown in its ‘case-by-case” approach to Taiwan’s
request.
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Notwithstanding such concerns, such an arrangement consider-
ing Taiwan as a limited sovereign entity is not new for Taiwan.  And
the adoption and application of the mutual non-denial principle vir-
tually reconciles irreconcilable positions of Taiwan’s status for both
sides across the Strait.  Like other contested states, Taiwan has been
treated as a non-full-sovereign state in some of its bilateral relations
with allies since the 1970s, and its full maneuverability in a variety
of international activities often has been constrained.107
There are multiple advantages to accepting Taiwan, one of the
contested states, in international institutions.  The availability of the
institutional network and mechanism serves as a mediated mecha-
nism for contesting parties to solve issues of mutual concern with-
out battling tenaciously over politically charged matters.  Second, if
one accepts the claims of the functionalist school in integration
studies, one should hope that the “domestication” of reiterated in-
teractions on the international level may nurture goodwill, establish
a convenient precedent for future reference and adoption in other
areas, and eventually firm up habits of cooperation and mutual
trust.  Third, multilateralism is an option to overcome the cross-
Strait bilateral stalemate and to tone down the pressure of domestic
politicking in each respective society.  In the end, one important
task for dealing with Taiwan’s requests for more international par-
ticipation is to envision and design an institutional arrangement ac-
ceptable to both sides with regard to the representative title, status,
rights, and benefits of Taiwan’s membership without arousing any
fear of the recognition of sovereign statehood on the part of the
challenging state.
VII. CONCLUSIONS: REFRAME AND REBUILD
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS
The traditional Westphalia concept of sovereignty has been
constantly contested in the age of globalization and has to be modi-
fied to fit the specific time, place, and other circumstances.  In par-
ticular, those political entities lacking de jure recognition, the so-
called “contested states” like Taiwan, with uncertain and restrictive
legal statuses in their proclamations of sovereignty, have faced un-
bearable challenges in participating in IGOs.  Thus, they have had
limited opportunities to benefit from the growing scope of interna-
tional governance.  The traditional emphasis on Westphalian sover-
107. J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 49-50.
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eignty has not ruled out the possibility for political entities,
including a contested state like Taiwan, from seeking “a ticket of
general admission to the international arena.”108  Broad participa-
tion of multiple political actors closes the “jurisdiction gap” and en-
hances the legitimacy and representation of international
institutions in the management of global public goods.109  There are
ample examples in which contested states have reached agree-
ments, participated in international organizations, and secured re-
sources for security maintenance and economic vitality.  The failure
to gain widespread recognition based on the Westphalian sover-
eignty model should not preclude Taiwan from engaging in activi-
ties that only recognition facilitates.
Dworkin’s words resonate with Taiwan’s public sentiment to
expand its international space: “the right of a political community
to treat its members as having obligations in virtue of collective
community decisions — is to be found not in the hard terrain of
contracts or duties of justice or obligations of fair play that might
hold among strangers. . .but in the more fertile ground of fraternity,
community, and their attendant obligations.”110  Thus, when politi-
cal leaders and legal practitioners are searching for answers to a
tough case like Taiwan’s membership status in IGOs or INGOs, one
should recall Dworkin’s claim that the interpretation, argumenta-
tion, and application of institutional laws, in the case of Taiwan,
should be perceived as a matter of communitarian interest and an
issue of moral reasoning, rather than a predicable application of
rules.
While institutions establish rules and regulations in their con-
stitutions to control and circumscribe the behaviors of members,
institutions and members should respond to new possibilities and
fresh circumstances beyond the institution’s present positioning.111
When past political strife about ideological beliefs, social norms,
and governance styles unfortunately have led to long-standing divi-
sions between political communities, one solution is to try to find a
common ground by changing the character of the dispute and rede-
108. Krasner, Sovereignty, 16.
109. For a discussion of the jurisdiction gap, please see Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg,
Marc A. Stern, ed., Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
110. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1986), 206.
111. Ben Colder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (New York: Routledge,
2009), 79.
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fining the problem through practice.  International institutions pro-
vide a perfect mechanism to bring cross-Strait relations into a co-
constitutive process at both levels—among states and within
states—through recognition of each side’s undeniable existence
based on the mutual non-denial principle.112  And the mutual non-
denial principle is trying to find a common and consensual political
frame in China.  At the same time, this standard allows both sides
to function internationally without piling up more hostilities.
Taiwan’s loss of international legal sovereignty in the 1970s has
not condemned it to oblivion.  Alternative arrangements by some
countries, especially the US, have provided a functional equivalent
of recognition for Taiwan’s continuous global operation.113  Facing
China’s demands for unification, Taiwan’s global connection to and
interaction with other states and non-state actors through IGOs and
INGOs is essential for its political survival and economic prosper-
ity.  China’s active promotion of Taiwan’s space of international
participation fits well into its national interests in recent promotion
of law diplomacy in international institutions related to cross-Strait
relations and global strategy.114  If a democratic Taiwan constantly
faces China’s suppression in international participation, China is
unlikely to present a wholly positive and benevolent image as a cru-
cial element of China’s vision of Pax Sinica in world affairs.  Tai-
wan’s request for the expansion of international space can be a
good opportunity for both Taiwan and China to look good in the
international community.
112. Nicholas Onuf, “Recognition and the Constitution of Epochal Change,” Inter-
national Relations, 27(2), 2013, 121-140.
113. Krasner, Sovereignty, 18-19, 42, 70.
114. Wenxian Zhang and Zhaomin Gu, “China’s Law Diplomacy: Theory and Prac-
tice,” Global Review, summer 2013, 40-41.
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